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How Qualified Immunity Fails
AB S TRACT. This Article reports the findings of the largest and most comprehensive study to
date of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation. Qualified immunity shields
government officials from constitutional claims for money damages so long as the officials did
not violate clearly established law. The Supreme Court has described the doctrine as incredibly
strong -protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Le-
gal scholars and commentators describe qualified immunity in equally stark terms, often criticiz-
ing the doctrine for closing the courthouse doors to plaintiffs whose rights have been violated.
The Court has repeatedly explained that qualified immunity must be as powerful as it is to pro-
tect government officials from burdens associated with participating in discovery and trial. Yet
the Supreme Court has relied on no empirical evidence to support its assertion that qualified
immunity doctrine shields government officials from these assumed burdens.
This Article is the first to test this foundational assumption underlying the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity decisions. I reviewed the dockets of 1,183 Section 1983 cases filed against state
and local law enforcement defendants in five federal court districts over a two-year period and
measured the frequency with which qualified immunity motions were brought by defendants,
granted by courts, and dispositive before discovery and trial. I found that qualified immunity
rarely served its intended role as a shield from discovery and trial in these cases. Across the five
districts in my study, just thirty-eight (3.9%) of the 979 cases in which qualified immunity could
be raised were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. And when one considers all the Section
1983 cases brought against law enforcement defendants-each of which could expose law en-
forcement officials to burdens associated with discovery and trial-just seven (0.6%) were dis-
missed at the motion to dismiss stage and thirty-one (2.6%) were dismissed at summary judg-
ment on qualified immunity grounds. My findings enrich our understanding of qualified
immunity's role in constitutional litigation, belie expectations about the policy interests served
by qualified immunity, and show that qualified immunity doctrine should be modified to reflect
its actual role in constitutional litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court appears to be on a mission to curb civil
rights lawsuits against law enforcement officers, and appears to believe quali-
fied immunity is the means of achieving its goal. The Supreme Court has long
described qualified immunity doctrine as robust-protecting "all but the plain-
ly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' And the Court's most
recent qualified immunity decisions have broadened the scope of the doctrine
even further.2 The Court has also granted a rash of petitions for certiorari in
cases in which lower courts denied qualified immunity to law enforcement
officers, reversing or vacating every one.' In these decisions, the Supreme
Court has scolded lower courts for applying qualified immunity doctrine in a
manner that is too favorable to plaintiffs and thus ignores the "importance of
qualified immunity 'to society as a whole."'" As Noah Feldman has observed,
the Supreme Court's recent qualified immunity decisions have sent a clear mes-
sage to lower courts: "The Supreme Court wants fewer lawsuits against police
to go forward."' And the Court believes that qualified immunity doctrine is the
way to keep the doors to the courthouse closed.
Among legal scholars and other commentators, there is a widespread belief
that the Supreme Court is succeeding in its efforts. Scholars report that quali-
fied immunity motions are raised frequently by defendants, are granted fre-
1. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
2. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTEs 62, 64-65 (2016); see also infra note 183 and accompanying text.
3. See Scott Michelman, Taylor v. Barkes: Summary Reversal Is Part of a Qualified Immunity
Trend, SCOTUSBLOG (June 2, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2o15/o6
/taylor-v-barkes-summary-reversal-is-part-of-a-qualified-immunity-trend [http://perma.cc
/86EN-KSLT]; see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 1o6 CALIF. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 45), http://ssm.com/abstract=2896508 [http://perma.cc
/ZF4C-N3DR] (observing that the Supreme Court found officers violated clearly estab-
lished law in just two of the twenty-nine qualified immunity cases decided by the Supreme
Court since 1982). In one of its most recent qualified immunity decisions, White v. Pauly, the
Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.
But, in so doing, the Court explained that the defendant "did not violate clearly established
law ... [o]n the record described by the Court of Appeals." 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
4. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 1-3 (2015) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
5. Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Has Had Enough with Police Suits, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 9,
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quently by courts, and often result in the dismissal of cases.6 As Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen Reinhardt has written, the Supreme Court's recent qualified
immunity decisions have "created such powerful shields for law enforcement
that people whose rights are violated, even in egregious ways, often lack any
means of enforcing those rights."' Three of the foremost experts on Section
1983 litigation-Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Martin Schwartz-have
concluded that recent developments in qualified immunity doctrine leave "not
much Hope left for plaintiffs."8
The widespread assumption that qualified immunity provides powerful
protection for government officials belies how little we know about the role
qualified immunity plays in the litigation of constitutional claims.9 The scant
evidence available on this topic points in opposite directions. Studies of quali-
6. See Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR. 143 (2014), http://www.fjc
.gov/sites/default/files/2o4/Section-1983-Litigation-3D-FJC-Schwartz-2o14.pdf [http://
perma.cc/JMQ9-92XN] (describing qualified immunity as "the most important defense" in
Section 1983 litigation, and stating that "courts decide a high percentage of Section 1983 per-
sonal-capacity claims for damages in favor of the defendant on the basis of qualified immun-
ity" (footnote omitted)); see also SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION 1983 § 8.5, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2017) ("Un-
der Harlow, defendants on summary judgment motion frequently will be dismissed without
a consideration of the merits."); Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting 'All but the
Plainly Incompetent" (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1023
(2012) ("Public officials can be more certain than ever before that qualified immunity will
shield them from suits for money damages even if their actions violate the constitutional
rights of another."); John C. Jeffries, What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV.
851, 852 (2010) ("The Supreme Court's effort to have more immunity determinations re-
solved on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss -in other words, to create immunity
from trial as well as from liability -has been largely successful." (footnote omitted)).
7. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The
Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights
and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1245 (2015); see also
Caryn J. Ackerman, Comment, Fairness or Fiction: Striking a Balance Between the Goals of
§1983 and the Policy Concerns Motivating Qualified Immunity, 85 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1028
(20o6) (describing qualified immunity doctrine as "arguably one of the most significant ob-
stacles for § 1983 plaintiffs").
8. Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments:
Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TouRo L. REv. 633 (2013). Hope refers to Hope v. Pelzer,
a 2002 Supreme Court decision denying qualified immunity to prison guards who had
handcuffed the plaintiff to a hitching post. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The decision is viewed as
more "plaintiff friendly" than the Court's subsequent qualified immunity decisions. Blum,
Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra, at 654.
9. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the lack of empirical research concern-
ing qualified immunity litigation practice and the justifications underlying the doctrine). For
research regarding other aspects of qualified immunity doctrine, see infra notes lo, 18o.
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fied immunity decisions have found that qualified immunity motions are infre-
quently denied, suggesting that the doctrine plays a controlling role in the
resolution of many Section 1983 cases.o But when Alexander Reinert studied
the dockets in Bivens actions -constitutional cases brought against federal ac-
tors -he found that grants of qualified immunity led to just 2% of case dismis-
sals over a three-year period." If qualified immunity protects all but the "plain-
ly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,"12 and qualified
immunity motions are infrequently denied, how can qualified immunity be the
basis for dismissal of such a small percentage of cases?
More than descriptive accuracy is at stake in answering this question-it
goes to a core justification for qualified immunity's existence. Although the
concept of qualified immunity was drawn from defenses existing in the com-
mon law at the time 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, the Court has made clear
that the contours of qualified immunity's protections are shaped not by the
common law but instead by policy considerations." In particular, the Court
seeks to balance "two important interests - the need to hold public officials ac-
countable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield offi-
cials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably."14 Since the doctrine's inception, the Court has repeatedly stated
that financial liability is one of the burdens qualified immunity is intended to
protect against." Yet, as I showed in a prior study, law enforcement defendants
are almost always indemnified and thus rarely pay anything towards settle-
10. See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 145 n.1o6
(1999) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in 20% of federal cases over a two-year
period); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis,
36 PEPP. L. REv. 667, 691 (2009) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in 14% to 32%
of district court decisions); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 545 (2010) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in approximately 32% of
appellate decisions).
n1. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REv. 809, 845 (2010).
12. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
13. Justice Thomas has recently criticized this approach, arguing that qualified immunity doc-
trine should mirror historical common law defenses. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1870-72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For a dis-
cussion of this argument, and the relevance of my findings to this argument, see infra note
203 and accompanying text.
14. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
15. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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ments and judgments entered against them.16 Near certain and universal in-
demnification drastically reduces the value of qualified immunity as a protec-
tion against the burden of financial liability.
In recent years, the Court has focused increasingly on a different justifica-
tion for qualified immunity: the need to protect government officials from
nonfinancial burdens associated with discovery and trial." This desire has ar-
guably shaped qualified immunity more than any other policy justification for
the doctrine. " Yet we do not know to what extent discovery and trial burden
government officials, or the extent to which qualified immunity doctrine pro-
tects against those assumed burdens. Although both questions demand critical
investigation, this Article focuses on the latter. Assuming that discovery and
trial do impose substantial burdens on government officials, and that shielding
officials from discovery and trial is a legitimate aim of qualified immunity doc-
trine, to what extent does qualified immunity actually achieve its intended
goal?
To answer these questions, I undertook the largest and most comprehen-
sive study to date of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litiga-
tion. I reviewed the dockets of 1,183 lawsuits filed against state and local law
enforcement defendants over a two-year period in five federal district courts -
the Southern District of Texas, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern
District of Ohio, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern Dis-
trict of California.19 I tracked several characteristics of these cases including the
frequency with which qualified immunity was raised, the stage of the litigation
at which qualified immunity was raised, the courts' assessments of defendants'
qualified immunity motions, the frequency and outcome of interlocutory and
final appeals of qualified immunity decisions, and the cases' dispositions.
I found that, contrary to judicial and scholarly assumptions, qualified im-
munity is rarely the formal reason that civil rights damages actions against law
enforcement end. Qualified immunity is raised infrequently before discovery
begins: across the districts in my study, defendants raised qualified immunity
in motions to dismiss in 13.9% of the cases in which they could raise the de-
fense.20 These motions were less frequently granted than one might expect:
courts granted motions to dismiss in whole or part on qualified immunity
16. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
17. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Section I.B.
ig. See infra Part II for a description of my study design and methodology.
20. See infra Tables 2 & 3 and infra note ill and accompanying text.
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grounds 13.6% of the time.2 1 Qualified immunity was raised more often by de-
fendants at summary judgment and was more often granted by courts at that
stage. But even when courts granted motions to dismiss and summary judg-
ment motions on qualified immunity grounds, those grants did not always re-
sult in the dismissal of the cases -additional claims or defendants regularly re-
mained and continued to expose government officials to the possibility of
discovery and trial. Across the five districts in my study, just 3.9% of the cases
in which qualified immunity could be raised were dismissed on qualified im-
munity grounds.2 2 And when one considers all the Section 1983 cases brought
against law enforcement defendants -each of which could expose law enforce-
ment officials to whatever burdens are associated with discovery and trial-just
o.6% of cases were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage and 2.6% were
dismissed at summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.2 3
Although courts rarely dismiss Section 1983 suits against law enforcement
on qualified immunity grounds, there is every reason to believe that qualified
immunity doctrine influences the litigation of Section 1983 claims in other
ways. The threat of a qualified immunity motion may cause a person never to
file suit, or to settle or withdraw her claims before discovery or trial.24 Qualified
immunity motion practice and interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity de-
nials may increase the costs and delays associated with Section 1983 litigation.
The challenges of qualified immunity doctrine may cause plaintiffs' attorneys
to include claims in their cases that cannot be dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds - claims against municipalities, claims seeking injunctive relief, and
state law claims. Qualified immunity likely influences the litigation of cases
against law enforcement in each of these ways. But, as my study makes clear,
qualified immunity does not affect constitutional litigation against law en-
forcement in the way the Court expects and intends.
One should not conclude based on my findings that the Supreme Court
simply needs to make qualified immunity stronger. As a preliminary matter,
qualified immunity may not be well suited to weed out only insubstantial cas-
es.2 Moreover, my data suggest that qualified immunity is often fundamentally
21. See infra Table 7 (showing that qualified immunity was granted in whole in 9.1% of cases in
which a qualified immunity motion was raised at the motion to dismiss stage, and was
granted in part in 4.5% of such cases).
22. See infra Table 11 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Table 12 and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of these possibilities, see infra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 204-205.
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ill suited to dismiss filed cases, regardless of their underlying merits.2 6 Alt-
hough district courts recognize that they should dispose of cases as early as
possible on qualified immunity grounds, plaintiffs can often plausibly plead
clearly established constitutional violations and thus defeat motions to dismiss.
Factual disputes regularly prevent dismissal at summary judgment. And even
when courts grant qualified immunity motions, additional defendants or
claims often remain that continue to expose government officials to the bur-
dens of litigation. My data also suggest that qualified immunity is less essential
than has been assumed to serve its intended protective function. The Supreme
Court suggests in its opinions that qualified immunity is the only barrier
standing between government officials and the burdens of discovery and trial.
Instead, my study shows that litigants and courts have a wide range of tools at
their disposal to resolve Section 1983 cases.
One also should not conclude based on my findings that qualified immuni-
ty is more benign than has been assumed. My findings do show that Section
1983 claims against the police are infrequently dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds. But qualified immunity doctrine has been roundly criticized as inco-
herent, illogical, and overly protective of government officials who act uncon-
stitutionally and in bad faith.2 7 The fact that few cases are dismissed on quali-
fied immunity grounds does not fundamentally undermine these critiques.
Qualified immunity doctrine is intended by the Court to balance "the need
to hold government officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsi-
bly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties responsibly."2 8 Were qualified immunity relia-
bly insulating government officials from the burdens of litigation in insubstan-
tial cases, one could argue that the doctrine's incoherence, illogic, and overpro-
tection of government officials were unfortunate but necessary to further
government interests. Yet available evidence suggests that qualified immunity
is not achieving its policy objectives; the doctrine is unnecessary to protect gov-
ernment officials from financial liability and ill suited to shield government
officials from discovery and trial in most filed cases. Qualified immunity may,
in fact, increase the costs and delays associated with constitutional litigation.
Qualified immunity might benefit the government in other ways, and further
11
26. See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of these critiques, see infra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
28. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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research is necessary to explore this possibility.29 But the evidence now availa-
ble weakens the Court's current justifications for the doctrine's structure and
highly restrictive standards. The Supreme Court has written that evidence un-
dermining its assumptions about the realities of constitutional litigation might
"justify reconsideration of the balance struck" in its qualified immunity deci-
sions.o Given my findings, it is high time for the Supreme Court to reconsider
that balance.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Su-
preme Court's assumptions about the burdens of discovery and trial for gov-
ernment officials, and the ways in which these assumptions have shaped quali-
fied immunity doctrine. In Part II, I describe the methodology of my study. In
Part III, I set forth my findings about the frequency with which law enforce-
ment defendants raise qualified immunity, the frequency with which courts
grant qualified immunity, the frequency and outcome of qualified immunity
interlocutory and final appeals, and the frequency with which qualified im-
munity disposes of plaintiffs' cases. In Part IV, I consider the implications of
my findings for descriptive accounts of qualified immunity's role in constitu-
tional litigation and expectations about the policy interests served by qualified
immunity doctrine. I also suggest adjustments to qualified immunity that
would create more consistency between the doctrine and its actual role in con-
stitutional litigation.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY'S EXPECTED ROLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
The Supreme Court has long viewed qualified immunity as a means of pro-
tecting government officials from burdens associated with participating in dis-
covery and trial in insubstantial cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court has justified
several major developments in qualified immunity doctrine over the past thir-
ty-five years as means of protecting government officials from these assumed
burdens. In this Part, I describe the Court's stated assumptions about the pur-
poses served by qualified immunity, the ways in which those assumptions have
shaped qualified immunity doctrine, and the lack of evidence supporting the
Court's concerns and interventions.
29. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text for a description of remaining questions
about the way qualified immunity doctrine functions and the extent to which it achieves its
intended goals.
30. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642 1-3 (1987).
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A. The Court's Concerns About the Burdens of Litigation
The Supreme Court has made clear that its qualified immunity jurispru-
dence reflects the Court's view about how best to balance "the importance of a
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens" against "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public in-
terest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.3 1 Yet the
Court's descriptions of the ways in which qualified immunity protects govern-
ment officials have shifted over time.
The Supreme Court's original rationale for qualified immunity was to
shield officials from financial liability. The Court first announced that law en-
forcement officials were entitled to a qualified immunity from suits in the 1967
case of Pierson v. Ray.32 That decision justified qualified immunity as a means
of protecting government defendants from financial burdens when acting in
good faith in legally murky areas.3 3 Qualified immunity was necessary, accord-
ing to the Court, because " [a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he had probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does."34 The
scope of the qualified immunity defense is in many ways consistent with an in-
terest in protecting government officials from financial liability. For example,
qualified immunity does not attach in claims against municipalities, claims
against some private actors, and claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.35 In-
deed, the Court has been clear that municipalities and private prison guards are
not entitled to qualified immunity in part because neither type of defendant is
threatened by personal financial liability. 3 6
31. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
32. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
33. Id. at 555; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) ("Liability for damages for
every action which is found subsequently to have been violative of a student's constitutional
rights and to have caused compensable injury would unfairly impose upon the school deci-
sionmaker the burden of mistakes made in good faith in the course of exercising his discre-
tion within the scope of his official duties.").
34. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555-
35. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (observing that qualified immunity is
not available in "criminal cases and § 1983 cases against a municipality, as well as § 1983 cas-
es against individuals where injunctive relief is sought instead of or in addition to damag-
es"); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (holding that private prison guards
are not entitled to qualified immunity); Wood, 420 U.S. at 315 n.6 (" [I]mmunity from dam-
ages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well.").
36. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411 (finding that private actors' insurance "increases the likelihood
of employee indemnification and to that extent reduces the employment-discouraging fear
13
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The Supreme Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, fifteen years after
Pierson, expanded the policy goals animating qualified immunity. The Court
explained in Harlow that qualified immunity was necessary not only to protect
government officials from financial liability, but also to protect against "the di-
version of official energy from pressing public issues," "the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office," and "the danger that fear of being
sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irrespon-
sible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.'""
In subsequent cases, the Court has focused increasingly on the need to pro-
tect government officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial,
with the expectation that qualified immunity can protect government officials
from those burdens. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Court reaffirmed the Harlow
Court's conclusion that qualified immunity was necessary to protect against the
burdens associated with both trial and pretrial matters, like discovery, because
'[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective govern-
ment.""' In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court again emphasized the value of qualified
immunity in curtailing the time-intensive discovery process. As the Court ex-
plained:
The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including "avoidance of disruptive dis-
covery." There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Govern-
ment official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formula-
tion of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation
and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation,
though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts
heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
of unwarranted liability potential applicants face"); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 653 (1980) (concluding that municipalities should not be protected by qualified im-
munity in part because concerns about overdeterrence are "less compelling, if not wholly in-
applicable, when the liability of the municipal entity is at stake"). The Court has offered lit-
te explanation why the qualified immunity defense is not available in claims for
nonmonetary relief.
37. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cit. 1949)).
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resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of
the work of the Government."
In recent years, the interest in shielding government officials from the bur-
dens of discovery and trial has taken center stage in the Court's qualified im-
munity calculations. In 1997, the Supreme Court made clear that "the risk of
'distraction' alone cannot be sufficient grounds for an immunity."40 Twelve
years later, in 2009, the Court described protecting government officials from
burdens associated with discovery and trial as the "'driving force' behind [the]
creation of the qualified immunity doctrine."4 1
The Court's interest in protecting government officers from burdens asso-
ciated with discovery and trial extends not only to defendants but to other gov-
ernment officials who may be required to testify, respond to discovery, or oth-
erwise participate in litigation. In Filarsky v. Delia, the Court held that a private
actor retained by the government to carry out its work was entitled to qualified
immunity in part because the "distraction of lawsuits . . . will also often affect
any public employees with whom they work by embroiling those employees in
litigation."4 2
B. Doctrinal Impact of the Court's Desire To Protect Defendants from Discovery
and Trial
Over the past thirty-five years, the Court's interest in protecting govern-
ment officials from discovery and trial has shaped qualified immunity in several
important ways. Granted, some aspects of qualified immunity doctrine are in-
consistent with the Court's interest in protecting government officials from dis-
covery and trial. After all, government officials must participate in discovery
and trial in claims against municipalities - as witnesses, if not as defendants. In
addition, government officials must participate in discovery and trial in claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Yet, in the years since Pierson, the Court's
concerns about the burdens of discovery and trial have led the Court to remove
the subjective prong of the qualified immunity defense, adjust the process by
which lower courts assess qualified immunity motions, and allow interlocutory
appeals of qualified immunity denials.
39. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (citation omitted).
40. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411.
41. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
64o n.2 (1987)).
42. 566 U.S. 377, 391 (2012).
15
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1. Defendants' State of Mind
The Court's interest in shielding government defendants from discovery
and trial underlay its decision to eliminate the subjective prong of the qualified
immunity defense. From 1967, when qualified immunity was first announced
by the Supreme Court, until 1982, when Harlow was decided, a defendant seek-
ing qualified immunity had to show both that his conduct was objectively rea-
sonable and that he had a "good-faith" belief that his conduct was proper.43 In
Harlow, the Supreme Court concluded that the subjective prong of the defense
was "incompatible" with the goals of qualified immunity because an official's
subjective intent often could not be resolved before trial.44 Moreover, during
discovery, gathering evidence of an official's subjective motivation "may entail
broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an
official's professional colleagues."4 5 By eliminating the subjective prong of the
qualified immunity analysis, the Court believed it could "avoid 'subject[ing]
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-
reaching discovery' in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to
have violated were not clearly established at the time."4 6
2. The Order of Battle
The Court's concerns about burdens associated with litigation also influ-
enced its decisions regarding the manner in which courts should analyze quali-
fied immunity. The Supreme Court believes that lower courts deciding quali-
fied immunity motions are faced with two questions -whether a constitutional
right was violated, and whether that right was clearly established. But the
Court has wavered in its view regarding the order in which these questions
must be answered-what is often referred to as "the order of battle." In 2001,
the Supreme Court held in Saucier v. Katz that a court engaging in a qualified
immunity analysis must first decide whether the defendant violated the plain-
tiff's constitutional rights and then decide whether the constitutional right was
clearly established.4 7 The Court insisted on this sequence because it would al-
low "the law's elaboration from case to case.. . . The law might be deprived of
43. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 817.
46. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow, 457
U.S. at 817-18).
47. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
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this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the
law clearly established that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the circum-
stances of the case." 4 8
Eight years later, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reversed itself and con-
cluded that Saucier's two-step process was not mandatory.49 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Alito, writing for the Court, relied heavily on the fact that
courts considered the process mandated by Saucier to be unduly burdensome.so
Justice Alito also explained that the process wasted the parties' resources, writ-
ing that "Saucier's two-step protocol 'disserve[s] the purpose of qualified im-
munity' when it 'forces the parties to endure additional burdens of suit -such
as the costs of litigating constitutional questions and delays attributable to re-
solving them-when the suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily."'
Concerns about the burdens of litigation therefore led the Court to allow lower
courts not to decide the first question -whether the conduct was unconstitu-
tional-if they could grant the motion on the ground that the right was not
clearly established.
3. Interlocutory Appeals
The Court's interest in protecting government officials from the burdens of
discovery and trial also motivated its decision to allow interlocutory appeals of
qualified immunity denials.52 Generally speaking, litigants in federal court can
only appeal final judgments; interlocutory appeals are not allowed unless a
right "cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred."" The ques-
tion decided by the Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth was whether qualified immunity
should be understood as an entitlement not to stand trial that cannot be reme-
died by an appeal at the end of the case. In concluding that a denial of qualified
immunity could be appealed immediately, the Court relied on its assertion in
Harlow that qualified immunity was "an entitlement not to stand trial or face
48. Id.
49. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
50. Id. at 236-37.
51. Id. at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Law-
yers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, Pearson, 555 U.S. 223 (No. 07-751)).
52. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985). Note that a defendant can immediately ap-
peal a decision that the law was clearly established, but cannot immediately appeal a denial
of qualified immunity made on the grounds that there exists a genuine issue of fact for trial.
See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
53. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525.
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the other burdens of litigation."54 If qualified immunity protected only against
the financial burdens of liability, there would be no need for interlocutory ap-
peal; defendants denied qualified immunity could appeal after a final judgment
and before the payment of any award to a plaintiff Instead, the Court conclud-
ed, qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability; and . .. it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial."" Only an interest in protecting officials from discovery and trial can jus-
tify this holding.
C. The Lack ofEmpirical Support for the Court's Concerns and Interventions
The Supreme Court's qualified immunity decisions over the past thirty-five
years have relied on the assumptions that discovery and trial impose substantial
burdens on government officials, and that qualified immunity can shield gov-
ernment officials from these burdens. Four years after it decided Harlow, the
Court asserted that the decision had achieved the Court's goal of facilitating
dismissal at summary judgment.56 in subsequent years, the Court's repeated
invocation of the burdens of discovery and trial, and repeated reliance on qual-
ified immunity doctrine to protect defendants from those assumed burdens,
suggest the Court's continued faith in these positions. Yet the Court has relied
on no empirical evidence to support its views.
Scholars have decried the lack of empirical evidence about the realities of
civil rights litigation relevant to questions about the proper scope of qualified
immunity doctrine and the extent to which the doctrine achieves its intended
purposes. Twenty years ago, Alan Chen complained that the Court and its crit-
ics make assertions about the role of qualified immunity in constitutional liti-
gation without evidence to support their claims.1 7 Although scholars have em-
54. Id. at 526.
ss. Id.
56. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("The Harlow standard is specifically designed
to 'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstan-
tial claims on summary judgment, and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal." (emphasis
added)). Scholars appear to agree. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57. Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 102 (1997) ("Presently, there is no empirical
foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity doctrine or its critics. While
the Court has consistently hypothesized that significant social costs are engendered by
§ 1983 and Bivens litigation against individual government officials, it has never relied on
empirical data concerning the impact of constitutional tort litigation on officials' actual be-
havior. Similarly, while other commentators also have observed that qualified immunity liti-
i8
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pirically examined some questions about qualified immunity -paying particu-
lar attention to the impact of Pearson on the development of constitutional
law - the same is largely true today." As Richard Fallon has observed, "[W] e
could make far better judgments of how well qualified immunity serves the
function of getting the right balance between deterrence of constitutional viola-
tions and chill of conscientious official action if we had better empirical infor-
mation."" This Article, and my research more generally, aims to fill that gap.
II. STUDY METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the role that qualified immunity plays in the litigation of Sec-
tion 1983 suits, I reviewed the dockets of cases filed from January 1, 2011 to De-
cember 31, 2012 in five districts: the Southern District of Texas, Middle District
of Florida, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
Northern District of California. Several considerations led me to study these
five districts.
I chose to look at decisions from district courts in the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits because I expected that judges from these circuits
might differ in their approach to qualified immunity and to Section 1983 litiga-
tion more generally. This expectation was based on my review of district court
qualified immunity decisions from each of the circuits, as well as a view, shared
by others, that judges in these circuits range from conservative to more liber-
al.60 Moreover, commentators believe that courts in these circuits vary in their
approach to qualified immunity, with judges in the Third and Ninth Circuits
favoring plaintiffs, and judges in the Eleventh Circuit so hostile to Section 1983
cases that they are described as applying "unqualified immunity."6 1
gation may generate substantial social costs, they have offered no supporting empirical data
either." (footnotes omitted)).
58. See supra notes 10-12 and infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
59. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, So FORDHAM L.
REV. 479, 500 (2011).
6o. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 11, at 832 n.126 (citing Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common
Space, 23 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 303, 312 fig.4 (2007)).
61. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 250 n.151
(2013) (quoting Elizabeth J. Normal & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L.
REV. 1499, 1556 (2002)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) ("We have re-
peatedly told courts - and the Ninth Circuit in particular - not to define clearly established
law at a high level of generality" (citation omitted)); Charles R. Wilson, "Location, Location,
Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 445, 447-48 (2000) (describing the Eleventh Circuit as having a very restrictive view and
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I chose these five districts within these five circuits for two reasons. First, I
expected that these five districts would have a large number of cases to review:
from 2011 to 2012, these districts were among the busiest in the country, as
measured by case filings.62 Second, these five districts have a range of small,
medium, and large law enforcement agencies and agencies of comparable siz-
es.
63
I chose to review dockets instead of relying on the most obvious alterna-
tive -decisions available on Westlaw.64 Although Westlaw can quicldy sort out
decisions in which qualified immunity is addressed by district courts, Westlaw
could not capture information essential to my analysis about the frequency
with which qualified immunity protects government officials from discovery
and trial. First, a Westlaw search could capture no information about the num-
ber of cases in which qualified immunity was never raised. In addition, a
Westlaw search could not capture information about the number of cases in
which qualified immunity was raised by the defendant in his motion but was
not addressed by the court in its decision. Even when a defendant raises a qual-
ified immunity defense and the district court addresses qualified immunity in
its decision, the decision may not appear on Westlaw-Westlaw does not cap-
ture motions resolved without a written opinion, and includes only those opin-
ions that are selected to appear on the service.65 in other words, opinions on
other circuits, including the Third Circuit, as having a broader view of what constitutes
"clearly established" law).
62. See Judicial Facts and Figures, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. tbl.4 .2 (Sept. 30, 2012), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics-import dir/Table4o2_6.pdf [http://perma
.cc/697A-JWVH].
63. For example, the Philadelphia and Houston Police Departments are both large, with be-
tween 5,000 and 7,000 officers; the Cleveland Police Department, San Francisco Police De-
partment, and Jacksonville Sheriff's Office are midsized, with between 1,600 and 2,000
officers; the Orlando Police Department and Oakland Police Department each have between
750 and 800 officers; and all five districts have smaller agencies. See Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA), NAT'L ARCHIVE CRIM.
JUST. DATA (2008) [hereinafter BJS Law Enforcement Census Data], http://www.icpsr
.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/27681 [http://perma.cc/MLQ3-W2AH].
64. Most empirical studies examining qualified immunity have relied on decisions available on
Westlaw. See sources cited supra note io and infra note 180. One notable exception is Alex-
ander Reinert's study of Bivens dockets. See Reinert, supra note II, at 834.
65. Relying on Westlaw would have significantly reduced the number of qualified immunity
opinions in my dataset. There are a total of 365 district court decisions on motions raising
qualified immunity in my dataset. See infra Table 6. I searched on Westlaw for each of the
365 qualified immunity decisions I found on Bloomberg Law, and 178 (48.8%) of those deci-
sions were available on Westlaw. Nineteen of fifty-six decisions (33.9%) on qualified im-
munity motions from the Southern District of Texas were available on Westlaw; forty-one
of ninety-one (45.1%) decisions on qualified immunity motions from the Middle District of
20
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Westlaw can offer insights about the ways in which district courts assess quali-
fied immunity when they choose to address the issue in a written opinion and
the opinion is accessible on Westlaw, but can say little about the frequency with
which qualified immunity is raised, the manner in which all motions raising
qualified immunity are decided, and the impact of qualified immunity on case
dispositions.
I reviewed the dockets of cases filed in 2011 and 2012 in the five districts in
my study.66 I searched case filings in the five districts in my study through
Bloomberg Law, an online service that has dockets otherwise available through
PACER and additionally provides access to documents submitted to the
court-complaints, motions, orders, and other papers.6 7 Within Bloomberg
Law, I limited my search to those cases that plaintiffs had designated under the
broad term "Other Civil Rights," nature-of-suit code 440.68 This search gener-
ated 462 dockets in the Southern District of Texas, 465 dockets in the Northern
District of Ohio, 674 dockets in the Middle District of Florida, 712 dockets in
Florida were available on Westlaw; thirty-seven of sixty-one (60.7%) decisions on qualified
immunity motions from the Northern District of Ohio; forty-six of seventy-six (60.5%) de-
cisions on qualified immunity motions from the Northern District of California; and thirty-
five of eighty-one (43.2%) decisions on qualified immunity motions from the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Cf David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine,
85 WASH. U. L. REv. 681, 710 (2007) (finding that only 3% of all district court orders appear
on Westlaw).
66. I chose this two-year period because it is a recent period in which most (if not all) cases have
been resolved by the time of this Article's publication.
67. See E-mail from Tania Wilson, Bloomberg BNA Law Sch. Relationship Manager, W. Coast,
to Kelly Leong, Reference Librarian, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 8, 2016, 12:18 PM) (on file
with author) (" [Bloomberg Law] ha[s] everything on PACER. We are also able to obtain
docket sheets and documents via courier retrieval (which would fill in the gap of some cases
not available electronically).").
68. Every complainant in federal court must choose from various "Nature of Suit" codes on the
"Civil Cover Sheet," also known as Form JS 44. See Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for
Sealed Settlement Agreements, 81 CHI-ICENT L. REV. 439, 452 & n-71 (20o6). Code 440 desig-
nates "Other Civil Rights" actions, excluding specific categories related to voting, employ-
ment, housing, disabilities, and education. The official description for Code 44o offers, as an
example, an "[a]ction alleging excessive force by police incident to an arrest." Civil Nature of
Suit Code Descriptions, U.S. CTs. (Aug. 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default
/files/js-o44_code-descriptions.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8A2-7H7T]. It is possible that some
plaintiffs in Section 1983 cases against state and local law enforcement did not choose Code
440. Code 550, for example, is titled "Prisoner Petitions-Civil Rights," but its proper use is
limited to suits "alleging a civil rights violation by corrections officials." Id. Bloomberg Law
separately allows users to filter using the "Cause of Action" field on the Civil Cover Sheet.
But that field does not impose a limited set of options on complainants, and I found that
many Section 1983 cases were not correctly designated. Accordingly, I used the nature-of-
suit search.
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the Northern District of California, and 1,435 dockets in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. I reviewed the complaints associated with these 3,748 dockets
and included in my dataset those cases, brought by civilians, alleging constitu-
tional violations by state and local law enforcement agencies and their employ-
ees.
6 9
I limited my study to cases brought by civilians against law enforcement
defendants for several reasons. First, many of the Supreme Court's qualified
immunity decisions have involved cases brought against law enforcement. Of
the twenty-nine qualified immunity cases that the Supreme Court has decided
since 1982, almost half have involved constitutional claims against state and lo-
cal law enforcement. 70 Because the Court has developed qualified immunity
doctrine (and articulated its underlying purposes) primarily in cases involving
law enforcement, it makes sense to examine whether the doctrine is meeting its
express goals in these types of cases.
Limiting my study to Section 1983 cases against state and local law en-
forcement also creates some substantive consistency across the cases in my da-
taset. Most Section 1983 cases against state and local law enforcement allege
Fourth Amendment violations- excessive force, false arrest, and wrongful
searches - and, less frequently, First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Restricting my study to suits by civilians against state and local law enforce-
ment facilitates direct comparison of outcomes in similar cases across the five
districts in my study. Finally, much of my own prior research has focused on
lawsuits against state and local law enforcement, and maintaining this focus
here allows for future synthesis of my findings."
69. I limited my study to state and local law enforcement agencies identified in the Bureau of
Justice Statistics' Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. See BJS Law Enforcement
Census Data, supra note 63. I excluded decisions involving other types of government offi-
cials, including some government officials that perform law enforcement functions, like law
enforcement employed by school districts, state correctional officers, and federal law en-
forcement. I have additionally excluded Section 1983 actions brought by law enforcement
officials as plaintiffs. Finally, I removed duplicate filings, cases that were consolidated, and
cases that were improperly brought against law enforcement agencies located outside of the
five districts.
70. See Baude, supra note 3, at 45. In the remaining fifteen cases, two alleged constitutional vio-
lations by state corrections officials, nine alleged constitutional violations by federal law en-
forcement, and four asserted constitutional claims against government officials not involved
in the criminal justice system. See id.
71. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63
UCLA L. REv. 1144 (2016); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role
of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1023 (2010); Schwartz, su-
pra note 16; Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOzO L. REv. 841
(2012) [hereinafter Schwartz, What Police Learn].
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The resulting dataset includes a total of 1,183 cases from these five districts:
131 cases from the Southern District of Texas, 225 cases from the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida, 172 cases from the Northern District of Ohio, 248 cases from
the Northern District of California, and 407 cases from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. For each of these dockets, I tracked multiple pieces of infor-
mation relevant to this study, including whether the plaintiff(s) sued individual
officers and/or the municipality, the relief sought by the plaintiff(s), whether
the law enforcement defendant(s) filed one or more motions to dismiss on the
pleadings or for summary judgment, whether and when the defendant(s)
raised qualified immunity, how the court decided the motions raised by the de-
fendant(s), whether there was an interlocutory or final appeal of a qualified
immunity decision, and how the case was ultimately resolved. 72 Although some
of this information was available from the docket sheet, I obtained much of the
information by reading motions and opinions linked to the dockets on Bloom-
berg Law.
Although some of my coding decisions were straightforward, others in-
volved less obvious choices. Because my coding decisions may make most sense
when reviewed in context, I have described those decisions in detail in the
footnotes accompanying the data.73 Throughout, my coding decisions were
guided by my focus on the role that qualified immunity played in the resolu-
tion of cases and the frequency with which the doctrine meets its goal of shield-
ing government officials from discovery and trial.
My dataset is comprehensive in the five chosen districts. It includes most-
if not all- Section 1983 cases filed by civilians against state and local law en-
forcement in these federal districts over a two-year period, and it offers insights
about how frequently qualified immunity is raised in these cases, how courts
decide these motions, and how the cases are resolved. There are, however, sev-
eral limitations of the data. First, although I selected these five districts in part
to capture regional variation, they may not represent the full range of court and
litigant behavior nationwide. The marked differences in my data across dis-
tricts do, however, suggest a considerable degree of regional variation. Second,
the data offer no information about the role of qualified immunity in state
72. I tracked additional information as well, including whether the plaintiff was represented, the
attorneys involved in the cases, and the law enforcement agencies implicated in the cases.
These data are relevant to subsequent related projects I intend to undertake and are not re-
ported in this Article.
73. For descriptions of my coding decisions, see, for example, infra notes 82, 87, 88, 91, 93, 98.
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court litigation. This is in part because Bloomberg Law does not offer much in-
formation about the litigation of constitutional cases in state courts.74
Third, although this study sheds light on the litigation of constitutional
claims against state and local law enforcement officers, it does not necessarily
describe the role qualified immunity plays in the litigation of constitutional
claims against other types of government employees. It may be that the types
of constitutional claims often raised in cases against law enforcement -Fourth
Amendment claims alleging excessive force, unlawful arrests, and improper
searches - are particularly difficult to resolve on qualified immunity grounds in
advance of trial. Fourth Amendment claims may be comparatively easy to plead
in a plausible manner (and so could survive a motion to dismiss), and such
claims may be particularly prone to factual disputes (making resolution at
summary judgment difficult). If so, perhaps qualified immunity motions in
cases raising other types of claims would be more successful. On the other
hand, John Jeffries has argued that it may be particularly difficult to clearly es-
tablish that a use of force violates the Fourth Amendment because Fourth
Amendment analysis requires a fact-specific inquiry about the nature of the
force used and the threat posed by the person against whom force was used,
viewed from the perspective of an officer on the scene.7 ' Further research
should explore whether qualified immunity plays a different role in cases
brought against other government actors, or cases alleging different types of
constitutional violations.
Fourth, qualified immunity may be influencing the litigation of constitu-
tional claims in ways that cannot be measured through the examination of case
74. I looked at state court dockets available on Bloomberg Law for counties in the Northern Dis-
trict of California and found that very few had any information about motions filed (in the
instances that they were not removed to federal court). In addition, federal constitutional
cases filed in state court are at least sometimes removed to federal court. In the Northern
District of California, fifty-five of the 248 cases filed during the study period-22.2%-were
initially filed in state court and removed to federal court. In the Northern District of Ohio,
fifty-nine of the cases were removed from state court, which constitutes 34.3% of the 172 cas-
es filed in federal district court over those two years. In the Southern District of Texas, twen-
ty-seven cases were removed from state court, amounting to 20.6% of the 131 total filings in
federal district court. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sixty-three of the cases were
removed from state court, which constitutes 15.5% of the 407 cases filed in federal court over
these two years. In the Middle District of Florida, sixty of the cases were removed from state
court, which constitutes 26.7% of the 225 cases filed in federal court over these two years. Of
course, these figures do not capture how many cases were filed in state court but were not
removed.
75. See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 859-61.
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dockets.76 For example, my study does not measure how frequently qualified
immunity causes people not to file lawsuits. It also does not capture infor-
mation about the frequency with which plaintiffs' decisions to settle or with-
draw their claims are influenced by the threat of a qualified immunity motion
or decision. Exploration of these issues is critical to a complete understanding
of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation. I discuss these
issues in more depth in Part IV, and future research should explore these ques-
tions.7 7 Yet this Article illuminates several important aspects of qualified im-
munity's role in Section 1983 cases. Moreover, by measuring the frequency with
which qualified immunity motions are raised, granted, and dispositive, this Ar-
ticle reveals the extent to which the doctrine functions as the Supreme Court
expects and critics fear.
III. FINDINGS
The Supreme Court has explained that a goal of qualified immunity is to
"avoid 'subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the
burdens of broad-reaching discovery' in cases where the legal norms the offi-
cials are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time."78 Log-
ically, qualified immunity will only achieve this goal in a case if four conditions
are met.
First, the case must be brought against an individual officer and must seek
monetary damages. Qualified immunity is not available for claims against mu-
nicipalities or claims for noneconomic relief. Second, the defendant must raise
the qualified immunity defense early enough in the litigation that it can protect
him from discovery or trial. If the defendant seeks to protect himself from dis-
covery, he must raise qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss or a motion for
judgment on the pleadings; if a defendant seeks to protect himself from trial,
he can raise qualified immunity at the pleadings or at summary judgment.
76. For further discussion of these remaining questions about the role of qualified immunity in
constitutional litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 118-122.
77. See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
78. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)).
79. In some instances, motions for summary judgment may be made before the parties have en-
gaged in full-fledged discovery, either because the parties will attach documentary evidence
to their Rule 12 motion and the court will convert the motion to one for summary judgment,
or because the parties will engage in partial discovery sufficient only to address the qualified
immunity question. For further discussion of the frequency with which defendants in my
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Third, for a qualified immunity motion to protect government officials against
burdens associated with discovery or trial, the court must grant the motion on
qualified immunity grounds.so Finally, the grant of qualified immunity must
completely resolve the case. If qualified immunity is granted for an officer on
one claim but not another, that officer will continue to have to participate in the
litigation of the case. Even when a grant of qualified immunity results in the
dismissal of all claims against a defendant, that defendant may still have to par-
ticipate in the litigation of claims against other defendants. To be sure, the gov-
ernment official who has been dismissed from the case may no longer feel the
same psychological burdens associated with the litigation and may have lesser
discovery burdens than he would have had as a defendant. But the grant of
qualified immunity will not necessarily shield him from the burdens of partici-
pating in discovery and trial.
This Part describes my findings regarding the frequency with which each of
these conditions is met. I empirically examine six topics: (1) the number of cas-
es in which qualified immunity can be raised by defendants; (2) the number of
cases in which defendants choose to raise qualified immunity; (3) the stage(s)
of litigation at which defendants raise qualified immunity; (4) the ways in
which district courts decide qualified immunity motions; (5) the frequency and
outcome of qualified immunity appeals; and (6) the frequency with which
qualified immunity is the reason that a case ends before discovery or trial.
My findings regarding these six topics show that, at least in filed cases,
qualified immunity rarely functions as expected. Qualified immunity could not
be raised in more than 17% of the cases in my dataset, either because the cases
did not name individual defendants or seek monetary damages, or because the
cases were dismissed sua sponte by the court before the defendants had an op-
portunity to answer or otherwise respond. Defendants raised qualified immun-
ity in 37.6% of the cases in my dataset in which the defense could be raised. De-
fendants were particularly disinclined to raise qualified immunity in motions to
dismiss: they did so in only 13.9% of the cases in which they could raise the de-
fense at that stage. Courts granted (in whole or part) less than 18% of the mo-
tions that raised a qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity was the
reason for dismissal in just 3.9% of the cases in my dataset in which the defense
dataset moved for summary judgment without discovery, see infra note 86 and accompany-
ing text.
so. It is possible that a court could deny a qualified immunity motion in part or whole, but the
motion could nevertheless influence the courts' other rulings regarding discovery or other
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could be raised, and just 3.2% of all cases in my dataset. The remainder of this
Part describes each of these findings in more detail.
A. Cases in Which Qualified Immunity Cannot Play a Role
There are certain types of cases in which qualified immunity cannot play a
role. The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity does not apply to
claims against municipalities and claims for injunctive or declaratory relief."
Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot protect government officials from dis-
covery or trial in cases asserting only these types of claims. In my docket da-
taset of 1,183 cases, ninety-nine cases (8.4%) were brought solely against mu-
nicipalities and/or sought only injunctive or declaratory relief.82
TABLE 1.
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CAN BE RAISED, IN FIVE DISTRICTS
S.D. M.D. N.D. N.D. E.D.
TX FL OH CA PA Total




Cases brought against 11 44 20 7 23 105
individual defendants, (8.9%)
seeking damages, but
dismissed by court before
defendants respond
Section 1983 cases in which 106 155 139 219 360 979
QI can be raised by (82.8%)
defendants
Total Section 1983 cases 131 225 172 248 407 1,183
filed
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
In some of these instances, plaintiffs apparently intended to sue individual officers (indicat-
ed by the fact that they named Doe defendants) but were ultimately unable to identify the
officers. When Doe defendants are identified in the complaint and subsequently named, I
count these as cases against individual defendants; when Doe defendants are named but
their true identities are never identified, I count these as cases only against the municipality,
as the Doe defendants could not raise a qualified immunity defense unless they were identi-
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Even when cases are brought against individual officers and seek monetary
relief, there are some cases in which defendants have no need to raise qualified
immunity as a defense -cases dismissed sua sponte by the court before the de-
fendants respond to the complaint. In these cases, qualified immunity is un-
necessary to protect defendants from discovery and trial. In the five districts in
my docket dataset, 105 (8.9%) complaints naming individual law enforcement
officers and seeking damages were dismissed sua sponte by district courts be-
fore defendants answered or responded. Most often, district courts dismissed
these cases pursuant to their statutory power to review pro se plaintiffs' com-
plaints and dismiss actions they conclude are frivolous or meritless." Other
cases were dismissed by the court at this preliminary stage because the plain-
tiffs never served the defendants or failed to prosecute the case, or because the
court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be-
fore the defendants were served or responded.
Qualified immunity can only protect government officials from discovery
and trial in cases in which government defendants can raise the defense. De-
fendants could not raise qualified immunity in 8.4% of cases in my docket da-
taset because those cases did not name individual defendants and/or seek dam-
ages. Qualified immunity was unnecessary to shield government officials from
discovery or trial in another 8.9% of cases in my dataset because these cases
were dismissed by the district courts before defendants could raise the defense.
Accordingly, defendants could raise a qualified immunity defense in a total of
979 (82.8%) of the 1,183 complaints filed in the five districts during my two-
year study period.
B. Defendants' Choices: The Frequency and Timing of Qualified Immunity
Motions
Qualified immunity can only protect a defendant from the burdens of dis-
covery and trial if she raises the defense in a dispositive motion. Accordingly,
this Section examines the frequency with which defendants raise qualified im-
munity and the stage of litigation at which they raise the defense.84
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012). A total of seventy-one cases were dismissed on these
grounds. Note that district courts could exercise this power based on a belief that the de-
fendants were entitled to qualified immunity. However, none of these § 1915(e) dismissals
referenced or appeared to rely on qualified immunity as a basis for the decision.
84. Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, government defendants may also raise
qualified immunity in their answers. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c) (1). I did not track the frequency
with which government defendants raised qualified immunity in their answers because my
focus is on the frequency with which qualified immunity leads to case dismissal, but I found
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TABLE 2.
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IS RAISED
District Total cases in which QI could be raised Total cases raising QI
S.D. TX 106 58 (54.7%)
M.D. FL 155 84(54.2%)
N.D. OH 139 66 (47.5%)
N.D. CA 219 74(33.8%)
E.D. PA 360 86 (23.9%)
Total 979 368 (37.6%)
Defendants raised qualified immunity one or more times in 368 (37.6%) of
the 979 cases in which defendants could raise the defense. The frequency with
which defendants raised qualified immunity varied substantially by district.
Defendants in the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida
were most likely to raise the qualified immunity defense; in these districts, de-
fendants brought one or more motions raising qualified immunity in approxi-
mately 54% of the cases in which the defense could be raised. Defendants in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania were least likely to raise the qualified immuni-
ty defense; defendants brought one or more motions raising qualified immuni-
ty in approximately 24% of cases in which the defense could be raised. Defend-
ants in the Northern District of California brought qualified immunity motions
in 33.8% of possible cases, and in the Northern District of Ohio defendants
raised qualified immunity in 47.5% of possible cases.
I also explored the stage(s) of litigation at which qualified immunity was
raised. Of the 368 cases in which qualified immunity was raised at least once,
defendants in ninety-five (25.8%) cases raised qualified immunity only in a
motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants in 229
(62.2%) cases raised qualified immunity only in a motion for summary judg-
ment, and defendants in forty-one (11.1%) cases raised qualified immunity at
both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. Based on my re-
view of motions and opinions available on Bloomberg Law, I can confirm only
three cases in which defendants included qualified immunity in a motion at or
after trial for judgment as a matter of law. My data almost certainly underrepre-
sent the role qualified immunity plays at or after trial, however, as Bloomberg
no instances in which a defense raised in an answer led to dismissal without a separate mo-
tion raising the defense.
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Law does not include oral motions or court decisions issued without a written
opinion."
TABLE 3.
TIMING OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MOTIONS
QI raised QI raised QI raised
QI raised only QI raised only at both at both
at MTD/ only at at/after MTD & SJ & at/
District pleadings SJ trial SJ after trial Total
S.D. TX 15 37 0 6 0 58
(25.9%) (63.8%) (10.3%)
M.D. FL 33 32 0 18 1 84
(39.3%) (38.1%) (21.4%) (1.2%)
N.D. OH 14 49 0 3 0 66
(21.2%) (74.2%) (4.5%)
N.D. CA 11 56 0 6 1 74
(14.9%) (75.7%) (8.1%) (1.4%)
E.D. PA 22 55 1 8 0 86
(25.6%) (64.0%) (1.2%) (9.3%)
Total 95 229 1 41 2 368
(25.8%) (62.2%) (0.3%) (11.1%) (0.5%)
Across the five districts in my study, defendants raised qualified immunity
at summary judgment approximately twice as often as they did at the motion
to dismiss stage. In cases where defendants brought one or more qualified im-
munity motions, defendants in 73.9% of the cases raised qualified immunity at
summary judgment, whereas defendants in 37.0% of the cases raised qualified
immunity in a motion to dismiss. There is, however, regional variation in this
85. Even more difficult to decipher is the role qualified immunity might play in jury delibera-
tions. Although qualified immunity is a question of law, juries may be called upon to resolve
factual disputes relevant to qualified immunity and have been allowed to decide qualified
immunity in some instances. See, e.g., Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3 d 264, 269 (5 th Cir. 2008)
("The issue of qualified immunity is a question of law, but in certain circumstances where
'there remain disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the jury, properly in-
structed, may decide the question."' (citation omitted)); Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3 d 721, 728 (6th
Cir. 2005) (" [A] court can submit to the jury the factual dispute with an appropriate instruc-
tion to find probable cause and qualified immunity if the factual inquiry is answered one
way and to find probable cause and qualified immunity lacking if the inquiry is answered in
another way."). This study does not attempt to measure the frequency with which qualified
immunity is invoked in jury instructions, or the frequency with which juries' decisions are
influenced by such instructions.
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regard. Defendants in the Middle District of Florida were equally likely to raise
qualified immunity at the pleadings stage and at summary judgment, whereas
in the Northern District of Ohio and the Northern District of California de-
fendants were more than three times more likely to raise qualified immunity at
summary judgment than they were to raise the defense in a motion to dismiss.
Defendants in the Middle District of Florida were also more likely to raise
qualified immunity at more than one stage of litigation -they raised qualified
immunity at multiple stages of litigation in nineteen (22.6%) of the cases in
which they raised the defense. Defendants in the other districts less frequently
raised qualified immunity at multiple stages of litigation; they did so in six
(10.3%) of the cases in which the defense was raised in the Southern District of
Texas, in seven (9.5%) of the cases in which the defense was raised in the
Northern District of California, in eight (9.3%) of the cases in which the de-
fense was raised in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and in three (4.5%) of
the cases in which the defense was raised in the Northern District of Ohio.
I additionally sought to calculate how frequently defendants chose to raise
qualified immunity motions in all the cases in which such motions could be
brought. This calculation is relatively straightforward regarding motions to
dismiss. Defendants could have brought motions to dismiss on qualified im-
munity grounds in any of the 979 cases in which the defense could be raised
and did so in 136 (13.9%) of these cases.
Calculating the number of possible summary judgment motions on quali-
fied immunity grounds is more complicated. Although defendants could bring
a summary judgment motion in any case in which they could offer some evi-
dence in support, defendants generally do not move for summary judgment
without first engaging in at least some formal discovery.8 6 It is difficult to dis-
cern from case dockets to what extent parties have engaged in discovery, but
the dockets do reflect whether a case management order has been issued, which
generally sets the discovery schedule and is the first step of the discovery pro-
cess. If entry of a case management order can serve as an indication that a case
86. I located five cases in my dataset -two from the Southern District of Texas and one each
from the Northern District of California, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Middle Dis-
trict of Florida-in which defendants appear to have moved for summary judgment without
first conducting discovery. See Egan v. Cry. of Del Norte, No. 1:12-cV-o53oo (N.D. Cal. Oct.
11, 2012); Goodarzi v. Hartzog, No. 4:12-cV-02870 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012); Rollerson v.
City of Freeport, No. 4:12-cV-01790 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2012); Kline v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 2:11-cv-04334 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2011); Hill v. Lee Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 2:11-cV-00242
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2011). In two of these cases, Rollerson and Hill, the defendants brought a
motion to dismiss and simultaneously moved for summary judgment in the alternative; the
courts in both cases granted defendants' motions to dismiss without addressing the sum-
mary judgment motions.
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has entered discovery, and if one accepts that defendants in cases that have
conducted some discovery could move for summary judgment, then there are
577 cases in my dataset in which defendants could have moved for summary
judgment. Defendants brought summary judgment motions on qualified im-
munity grounds in 272 (47. 1%) of these cases.
I also calculated the total number of qualified immunity motions brought
by defendants. Defendants sometimes raised qualified immunity in multiple
motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions that were resolved by the
court in separate opinions: if, for example, defendants moved to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds, the court granted the motion with leave to
amend, and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendants might
again move to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds." Defendants filed a to-
tal of 440 qualified immunity motions in the 368 cases in which they raised the
defense. Table 4 reflects the stage of litigation at which these 440 motions were
brought and, again, reflects that defendants file significantly more qualified
immunity motions at summary judgment than at the motion to dismiss stage.
Of the 440 qualified immunity motions filed, 154 (35.0%) were filed in a mo-
tion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 283 (64.3%) were
filed at summary judgment.
87. There were a handful of instances in which different defendants contemporaneously filed
separate motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions raising qualified immunity. If
the motions were filed at approximately the same time and were resolved by a single district
court opinion, I coded them as a single motion because I believe it more accurately reflects
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TABLE 4.
TOTAL QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MOTIONS FILED, BY STAGE OF LITIGATION
Total Total QI
MTDs/pleadings Total SJ motions motions Total QI
District raising QI raising QI at/after trial motions
S.D. TX 23 46 0 69
(33.3%) (66.7%)
M.D. FL 59 51 1 111
(53.2%) (45.9%) (0.9%)
N.D. OH 17 54 0 71
(23.9%) (76.1%)
N.D. CA 23 67 1 91
(25.3%) (73.6%) (1.1%)
E.D. PA 32 65 1 98
(32.7%) (66.3%) (1.0%)
Total 154 283 3 440
(35.0%) (64.3%) (0.7%)
TABLE 5.
NUMBER OF OUALIFIED IMMUNITY MOTIONS PER CASE
District Number of motions in which QI was raised Total cases in
which QI could
Zero One Two Three Four Five be raised
S.D. TX 48 48 9 1 0 0 106
(45.3%) (45.3%) (8.5%) (0.9%)
M.D. FL 71 63 17 4 0 0 155
(45.8%) (40.6%) (11.0%) (2.6%)
N.D. OH 73 61 5 0 0 0 139
(52.5%) (43.9%) (3.6%)
N.D. CA 145 61 11 1 0 1 219
(66.2%) (27.9%) (5.0%) (0.5%) (0.5%)
E.D. PA 273 76 11 0 0 0 360
(75.8%) (21.1%) (3.1%)
Total 610 309 53 6 0 1 979
(62.3%) (31.6%) (5.4%) (0.6%) (0.1%)
Table 5 reflects the distribution of these 440 motions among the 368 cases
in which the defense was raised. Table 5 shows that when defendants raise
qualified immunity they usually do so in only one motion, but that defendants
in the Southern District of Texas and Middle District of Florida are more likely
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than defendants in the other three districts to file multiple motions raising
qualified immunity.
Finally, I explored how frequently defendants raise other types of defenses
in motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and in summary judg-
ment motions. Qualified immunity is usually one of several arguments defend-
ants make in their motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Indeed, de-
fendants sometimes move to dismiss or for summary judgment without raising
qualified immunity at all.
Of the 979 cases in my docket dataset in which defendants could raise qual-
ified immunity, defendants filed a total of 462 motions to dismiss, and 154
(33.3%) included a qualified immunity argument." Defendants in the Middle
District of Florida were the most likely to raise qualified immunity in motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings -defendants included a qualified
immunity argument in 45.4% of their motions, compared with 39.0% of the
motions filed by defendants in the Southern District of Texas, 32.1% of the mo-
tions filed by defendants in the Northern District of Ohio, 26.2% of the mo-
tions filed by defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 23.5% of
the motions filed by defendants in the Northern District of California. Motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings that did not raise qualified im-
munity argued instead that the complaint did not satisfy plausibility pleading
requirements, concerned a claim that was barred by a criminal conviction, or
otherwise did not state a legally cognizable claim. 9
88. See infra Figure 1. I have included in my count of motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment instances in which the municipality moved to dismiss but the individual defend-
ant(s) did not. One could take issue with this choice, as municipalities are not protected by
qualified immunity. Yet I included these motions in my calculation because they reflect op-
portunities in which the law enforcement defendants moved to dismiss but failed to raise
qualified immunity in the motion.
89. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (setting out the plausibility
pleading standard); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff
seeking damages for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence must have that conviction or
sentence declared invalid before a Section 1983 claim can proceed).
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FIGURE 1.
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Defendants in all five districts were far more likely to include a qualified
immunity argument in their summary judgment motions. Defendants filed 374
motions for summary judgment, and 283 (75.7%) of those motions included an
argument based on qualified immunity. There was some variation among the
districts in this area as well, although the regional variation was less pro-
nounced here than in other aspects of qualified immunity litigation practice.o
go. Qualified immunity was raised in 64.4% of summary judgment motions filed in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, 76.7% of summary judgment motions filed in the Southern District
of Texas, 79.8% of summary judgment motions filed in the Northern District of California,
81.0% of summary judgment motions filed in the Middle District of Florida, and 81.8% of
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C. District Courts' Decisions: The Success Rate of Qualified Immunity Motions
This Section examines how frequently district courts grant motions to dis-
miss and for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. As I have
shown, qualified immunity is almost always raised in conjunction with other
arguments in motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. My focus here is
on the way the district court evaluates the qualified immunity argument.
TABLE 6.
SUCCESS OF MOTIONS RAISING OUALIFIED IMMUNITY
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
QI denied 15 33 27 30 34 139
(21.7%) (29.7%) (38.0%) (33.0%) (34.7%) (31.6%)
QI granted 7 7 6 5 1 26
in part (10.1%) (6.3%) (8.5%) (5.5%) (1.0%) (5.9%)
QI granted 16 18 3 11 5 53
in full (23.2%) (16.2%) (4.2%) (12.1%) (5.1%) (12.0%)
QI in the alterna- 5 12 11 9 13 50
tive/fails 1st step (7.2%) (10.8%) (15.5%) (9.9%) (13.3%) (11.4%)
Grant (not on QI) 7 13 12 13 17 62
(10.1%) (11.7%) (16.9%) (14.3%) (17.3%) (14.1%)
Grant (reasoning 2 2 0 0 5 9
unclear) (2.9%) (1.8%) (5.1%) (2.0%)
GiP (not on QI or 4 6 2 8 6 26
QI in alt.) (5.8%) (5.4%) (2.8%) (8.8%) (6.1%) (5.9%)
Not decided 13 20 10 15 17 75
(18.8%) (18.0%) (14.1%) (16.5%) (17.3%) (17.0%)
Total motions 69 111 71 91 98 440
In the five districts in my docket dataset, defendants raised qualified im-
munity in a total of 440 motions. Table 6 reflects the way in which district
courts resolved those motions.91 Across the five districts in my study, qualified
91. I have coded decisions in a way that focuses on the role of qualified immunity in the deci-
sion. If a defendant's motion raises multiple arguments and qualified immunity is granted
but all other bases for the motion are denied, I coded that decision as granted on qualified
immunity grounds. Conversely, if a defendant's motion raises multiple arguments and qual-
ified immunity is denied and all other bases for the motion are granted, I coded that decision
as denied on qualified immunity. Included in the "QI granted in part" row are decisions in
which one or more defendants who have moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds
36
127:2 2017
HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FAILS
immunity motions were denied 31.6% of the time.92 Qualified immunity mo-
tions in these five districts were granted in part-on some claims or defendants
but not others-5.9% of the time and granted in full on qualified immunity
grounds 12.0% of the time. In another 11.4% of the decisions, courts concluded
that the plaintiff had not met her burden of establishing a constitutional viola-
tion and either declined to reach the second step of the qualified immunity
analysis (whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the law was
clearly established) or granted qualified immunity in the alternative.9' Courts
in 14.1% of the decisions granted defendants' motions on other grounds with-
out addressing qualified immunity, and in another 2.0% of the decisions the
courts offered little or no rationale. Courts in 5.9% of the decisions granted the
motion in part without mentioning qualified immunity, or on qualified im-
munity in the alternative. And district courts in my study did not decide 17.0%
of the motions raising qualified immunity, usually because the cases settled or
were voluntarily dismissed while the motions were pending.
There was substantial variation in courts' decisions across the districts in
my study. The Southern District of Texas had the lowest rate of qualified im-
munity denials (21.7%). In the remaining four districts, judges denied 30-38%
of defendants' qualified immunity motions. The Southern District of Texas al-
so had the highest rate of qualified immunity grants: courts in the Southern
District of Texas granted 33.3% of defendants' qualified immunity motions in
part or full on qualified immunity grounds. In contrast, courts in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted only 6.1% of the qualified immunity motions
in whole or part on qualified immunity grounds.9 4
were awarded qualified immunity but qualified immunity was denied for some defendants
or claims.
92. This finding is consistent with findings in other qualified immunity studies described supra
note lo, even though there are significant differences in our datasets and the manner in
which we coded decisions.
93. If a court did not specify which step of the qualified immunity analysis was dispositive, or
concluded that the law was not clearly established without resolving whether a constitution-
al violation occurred, I coded these decisions as grants or partial grants on qualified im-
munity grounds. These decisions are reflected in rows two and three of Tables 6-8.
94. The differences in the frequency with which motions are granted or granted in part on qual-
ified immunity grounds (rows two and three in Table 6) across the five districts are statisti-
cally significant (X2 = 23.32, p<.ooi). But the differences in the frequency with which quali-
fied immunity is denied (row one in Table 6) across the five districts are not statistically
significant (X2 = 5.15, p=.27). The differences in the frequency with which motions are
granted in the alternative or granted in part on grounds other than qualified immunity
(rows four, five, six, and seven in Table 6) across the five districts are also not statistically
significant (X2 = 5-58, p=.23).
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TABLE 8.
RULINGS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS THAT RAISED QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
QI denied 9 15 23 23 21 91
(19.6%) (29.4%) (42.6%) (34.3%) (32.3%) (32.2%)
QI granted 5 5 5 3 1 19
in part (10.9%) (9.8%) (9.3%) (4.5%) (1.5%) (6.7%)
QI granted 12 13 3 9 2 39
(26.1%) (25.5%) (5.6%) (13.4%) (3.1%) (13.8%)
QI in the alterna- 4 9 7 8 11 39
tive/fails 1st step (8.7%) (17.6%) (13.0%) (11.9%) (16.9%) (13.8%)
Grant (not on QI) 4 2 10 7 13 36
(8.7%) (3.9%) (18.5%) (10.4%) (20.0%) (12.7%)
Grant (reasoning 2 0 0 0 1 3
unclear) (4.3%) (1.5%) (1.1%)
GiP (not on QI or 2 0 0 5 3 10
QI in alt.) (4.3%) (7.5%) (4.6%) (3.5%)
Not decided 8 7 6 12 13 46
(17.4%) (13.7%) (11.1%) (17.9%) (20.0%) (16.3%)
Total motions 46 51 54 67 65 283
I additionally evaluated differences in courts' decisions at the motion to
dismiss and summary judgment stages." Of the 154 motions to dismiss and
motions for judgment on the pleadings raising qualified immunity, courts
granted seventy-nine (51.3%) of the motions in whole or part. Twenty-one
(26.6%) of those seventy-nine full or partial grants were decided on qualified
immunity grounds. Of the 283 summary judgment motions raising qualified
immunity, courts granted 146 (51.6%) in whole or part. Fifty-eight (39.7%) of
those 146 full or partial grants were decided on qualified immunity grounds. In
other words, although courts were equally likely to grant summary judgment
motions and motions to dismiss, courts were more likely to grant summary
judgment motions on qualified immunity grounds than they were to grant mo-
tions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. But courts more often than
not granted both types of motions on grounds other than qualified immunity.
39
95. See supra Tables 7 & 8. Because the three qualified immunity motions raised at or after trial
are not included in these tables, there are a total of 437 motions included in these two ta-
bles - three fewer than the 440 motions included in Table 6.
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D. Circuit Courts' Decisions: The Frequency and Success of Qualified Immunity
Appeals
A complete examination of the role qualified immunity plays in constitu-
tional litigation must examine the frequency and outcome of qualified immuni-
ty appeals. Defendants can appeal denials of qualified immunity immediately,
and any qualified immunity decision can be appealed after a final judgment in
the case.96
TABLE 9.
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DENIALS
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
Affirmed 3 3 7 2 0 15 (36.6%)
Reversed 0 3 1 0 1 5 (12.2%)
Reversed in part 0 0 2 1 0 3 (7.3%)
Dismissed for lack 0 1 0 0 1(2.4%)
of jurisdiction
Withdrawn 2 3 6 5 0 16 (39.0%)
Pending 0 0 0 1 0 1 (2.4%)
Total interlocu- 5 9 17 9 1 41
tory appeals
Defendants immediately appealed 41 of the 189 qualified immunity deci-
sions in my docket dataset that were denied or granted in part and thus could
have been appealed at this stage of the litigation -an interlocutory appeal rate
of 21.7%. Across the five districts in my dataset, more than one-third of the
lower courts' decisions were affirmed on interlocutory appeal, 12.2% were re-
versed in whole, 7.3% were reversed in part, and 39.0% were withdrawn by the
parties without a decision by the court of appeals.
96. See supra Section I.B.3.
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TABLE 10.
FINAL APPEALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GRANTS
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
Affirmed 7 5 3 1 1 17
(65.4%)
Reversed 0 0 1 1 0 2
(7.7%)
Affirmed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
Withdrawn/ 3 4 0 0 0 7
dismissed (26.9%)
without decision
Pending 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total appeals by 10 9 4 2 1 26
plaintiff(s)
I also tracked the frequency with which plaintiffs appealed qualified im-
munity grants after a final judgment in the case. 7 Plaintiffs appealed twenty-
six (32.9%) of the seventy-nine decisions granting defendants' motions on
qualified immunity grounds in whole or part.98 Lower court decisions granting
qualified immunity were affirmed 65.4% of the time and reversed 7.7% of the
time. Almost 27% of the appeals were withdrawn without a decision.
E. The Impact of Qualified Immunity on Case Dispositions
A final question concerns the frequency with which a grant of qualified
immunity results in the dismissal of Section 1983 cases. There are multiple
ways to frame this inquiry. First, there is the question of which cases should be
counted in the numerator - cases dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. I
have included qualified immunity grants in this category unless the court end-
ed its qualified immunity analysis after concluding that the plaintiff could not
establish a constitutional violation, or granted the motion on qualified im-
munity in the alternative. Although the question of whether a constitutional
violation occurred is the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, the court
97. There was one case in the docket dataset in which a defendant appealed a qualified immuni-
ty decision at the end of the case. The jury verdict in the case was affirmed with no mention
of qualified immunity. See Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.3 d 161 (6th Cit. 2014).
98. I have not tracked appeals of motions granted on qualified immunity in the alternative,
granted in whole or in part on other grounds, or granted based on unclear reasoning.
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would also need to resolve this question in the absence of qualified immunity.
And although a court's decision to grant qualified immunity in the alternative
may influence its dispositive holding in some manner, the qualified immunity
decision was not necessary to resolve the case."
In addition, I have counted a case as dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds only if the entire case has been dismissed as a result of the motion.
One might assume that a grant of qualified immunity will always end a case.
Yet there are multiple scenarios in which a case can continue after a grant of
qualified immunity. At the pleadings stage, a court may grant a motion to dis-
miss on qualified immunity but also grant the plaintiff an opportunity to
amend her complaint. 00 Not all defendants in a case will necessarily move to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds,10 1 or a defendant may seek qualified
immunity regarding some but not all claims against him.102 State law claims
may also remain for which qualified immunity is not available, and these claims
may proceed in federal court or be remanded to and pursued in state court.o
99. If I included these cases in my count, the total number of cases dismissed on qualified im-
munity grounds would increase from thirty-eight to seventy-one: a total of fifteen cases in
the Southern District of Texas, twenty-three cases in the Middle District of Florida, twelve
cases in the Northern District of Ohio, eight cases in the Northern District of California, and
thirteen cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. This amounts to 7.3% of all cases in
which qualified immunity could be raised, and 6.o% of all the cases in my dataset.
ioo. See, e.g., Daleo v. Polk Cty. Sheriff, No. 8:11-cV-2521 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7,2011).
101. See, e.g., Tarantino v. Canfield, No. 5:12-cV-0434 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2012); Roberts v. Inight,
No. 4:12-cV-1174 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2012); Brivik v. Law, No. 8:11-cV-21o1 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
15, 2011); Terrell v. City of La Marque, No. 3:11-cV-0229 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2011).
102. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lake City, No. 3:11-cV-1210 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011); Snowden v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 2:11-cv-5041 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2011); Castillo v. City of Corpus
Christi, No. 2:11-cv-oo93 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2011); Kelley v. Papanos, No. 4:11-cv-o626 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 22, 2011).
103. See, e.g., McKay v. City of Hayward, No. 3:12-cV-1613 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012); Stephenson
v. McClelland, No. 4:11-cV-2243 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2011). There are eight cases in my da-
taset-six in the Middle District of Florida, one in the Northern District of Ohio, and one in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania -in which the federal claims were dismissed on quali-
fied immunity grounds and the state law claims were remanded to state court. I have sought
information about whether plaintiffs continued to litigate these claims in state court by con-
tacting the plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases. Attorneys in two cases confirmed that they
pursued the state claims in state court, and both cases resulted in settlements in state court.
See E-mail from Nicholas Noel, attorney for plaintiffs in O'Neill v. Kerrigan, No. 5:11-cv-3437
(E.D. Pa. June 5, 2011), to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:18 PM) (on file with author) (confirming
that the case was refiled in state court and settled after the federal claims were dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds); E-mail from Jerry Theophilopoulos, attorney for plaintiffs in
Merricks v. Adkisson, No. 8:12-cV-1805 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2012), to author (Mar. 13, 2017,
6:5o AM) (on file with author) (confirming that plaintiff refiled the case in state court after
the federal claims were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, and that the case settled
42
127:2 2017
HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FAILS
In addition, municipalities cannot assert qualified immunity; accordingly, if
there is a municipality named in the case at the time qualified immunity is
granted, the case will continue.104 Under each of these circumstances, govern-
ment officials still face the possibility that they will be required to participate in
discovery and trial as defendants, representatives of the defendants' agency,
and/or witnesses to the events in question."as
TABLE 11.
IMPACT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, BY STAGE OF LITIGATION
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
Motions raising QI 23 59 17 23 32 154
on the pleadings
Total QI grants on 4 5 0 2 3 14
the pleadings
Case dismissals on
QI at the pleadings 3 3 0 0 1 7
Motions raisil Q
at Summary,1-N 46 51 54 67 65 283
Total Qlgratsat 0 3 3 2 3
Case dismissalsoi 3 3 2 27QI at SJ
Total Q1appeals by 5 9 17 9 1 41
Ds
Total reversals 0 3 1 0 1 5
Case dismissals 0 2 1 0 1 4from appeal
at mediation for $30,000). Attorneys in two cases confirmed that the cases were not refiled
in state court. See E-mail from Cynthia Conlin, attorney for plaintiffs in Olin v. Orange Cty.
Sheriff No. 6:12-cV-1455 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2012), to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:31 AM) (on
file with author) (reporting that plaintiff did not pursue state law claims in state court after
federal claims were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds); E-mail from W Cort
Frohlich, attorney for plaintiffs in Spann v. Verdoni, No. 8:11-cv-o707 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4,
2011), to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:15 AM) (on file with author) (reporting that the state
claims were not refiled in state court after summary judgment was granted on the federal
claims). I sought but did not receive information about the other four cases.
104. See, e.g., McKay, No. 3:12-cv-1613; Porter v. City of Santa Rosa, No. 3:11-cv-4886 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2011); Terrell, No. 3:11-cv-0229.
105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing the Court's concerns about burdens on
government officials who are not named defendants).
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As Table 11 shows, there are fifty-three motions in my dataset that district
courts granted in full on qualified immunity grounds -fourteen at the plead-
ings stage and thirty-nine at summary judgment. Of those fifty-three motions,
thirty-four (64.2%) were dispositive, meaning that the cases were dismissed as
a result of the qualified immunity decision. Half of qualified immunity grants
at the pleadings stage led to case dismissals, and 69.2% of qualified immunity
grants at summary judgment led to case dismissals. Defendants brought forty-
one interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, and courts of appeals
reversed five (12.2%) of those decisions. All five reversals were of summary
judgment decisions, and four of the five resulted in case dismissals. In total,
qualified immunity led to dismissal of thirty-eight cases in my dataset.
The next question, when thinking about the impact of qualified immunity
on case disposition, is how to frame the denominator - the universe of cases
against which to measure the cases dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
It is my view that the broadest definition of the denominator - all 1,183 Section
1983 cases filed against law enforcement-offers the most accurate picture of
the role qualified immunity plays in Section 1983 litigation. Yet, as I will show,
there are at least three ways to frame the denominator, and each answers a
different question about the extent to which qualified immunity achieves its in-
tended goals.
One way to think about the impact of qualified immunity is to consider the
frequency with which a defendant's motion to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings, for summary judgment, or for judgment as a matter of law on qual-
ified immunity grounds actually leads to the dismissal of a case -whether be-
cause the motion is granted or because the motion is denied by the district
court but reversed on appeal. Presumably, a defendant will only bring a quali-
fied immunity motion when two conditions are met: he has a non-frivolous
basis for the motion, and he believes that the costs of bringing the motion are
justified by the likelihood of success or some other benefit associated with the
motion. Accordingly, this framework assesses the frequency with which quali-
fied immunity results in the dismissal of cases in which both these things are
true.
Defendants brought 440 qualified immunity motions in a total of 368 cases
in the five districts in my study: defendants raised qualified immunity in 154
motions to dismiss and raised qualified immunity in 283 summary judgment
motions. Courts granted 9.1% of the motions to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds, and 4.5% of the motions resulted in case dismissals. Courts granted
13.8% of the summary judgment motions on qualified immunity grounds, and
9.5% of the motions resulted in case dismissals. Defendants brought forty-one
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, courts of appeals reversed
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five (12.2%) of those decisions, and four of the five were dismissed as a result.
In total, thirty-eight (8.6%) of the 440 qualified immunity motions raised by
defendants in my dataset resulted in case dismissals, and 10.3% of the 368 cases
in which qualified immunity was raised were dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds.
Another way to assess the impact of qualified immunity on case outcomes is
to examine what percentage of the 979 cases in my dataset in which qualified
immunity could be raised were in fact dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds. One objection to this framing might be that it includes cases that de-
fendants declined to challenge on qualified immunity grounds. But qualified
immunity motions would not necessarily have failed in these cases; rather, de-
fendants in these cases concluded that the costs of raising the defense were not
justified by the likelihood of success or other benefits of bringing the motions.
Moreover, this broader framework illustrates the frequency with which quali-
fied immunity doctrine serves its intended and expected role of shielding gov-
ernment officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial. Evaluated
in this manner, qualified immunity is less frequently successful. Qualified im-
munity was the basis for dismissal in 3.9% of the 979 cases in which the de-
fense could be raised: just seven (0.7%) of cases were dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, and thirty-one (3.2%) of
cases were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at summary judgment -
either by the district court or on appeal.
Indeed, to evaluate fully the role that qualified immunity plays in the reso-
lution of constitutional claims against law enforcement, the most appropriate
denominator is the complete universe of 1,183 cases in my dataset. This ap-
proach includes cases that could not be resolved on qualified immunity
grounds -because the cases were either brought only against municipalities or
sought only equitable relief. But to the extent that the Court views qualified
immunity doctrine as a shield for all government officials - not only defend-
ants -from burdens associated with discovery and trial, a thorough assessment
of qualified immunity's role should take account of all the cases in which gov-
ernment officials must participate. Qualified immunity was the basis for dis-
missal in 3.2% of the 1,183 cases in my dataset: o.6% of cases were dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, and 2.6% of cases
were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at summary judgment -either
by the district court or on appeal. 106
io6. These findings are consistent with another study that used dockets to track case outcomes in
Bivens actions. See Reinert, supra note II, at 843 (finding qualified immunity to be "the basis
for a dismissal in only 5 out of the 244 complaints studied").
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My data show that qualified immunity is rarely the formal reason that Sec-
tion 1983 cases are dismissed. How, then, are Section 1983 suits against law en-
forcement resolved? Table 12 reports case outcomes for the 1,183 cases in the
five districts in my study.
TABLE 12.
CASE DISPOSITIONS







Dismissed for failure to
prosecute
Remanded to state court
Motion to dismiss granted
(not based on QI)
Summary judgment
granted (not based on QI)
Directed verdict for D (not
based on QI)
MTD granted based on QI
SJ granted based on QI
QI granted at or after trial
QI granted on appeal
Case open, stayed, or on
appeal
Trial - plaintiff verdict































17 13 16 21 33 100
0 0 0 1 2 3
3 3 0 0 1 7
(0.6%)
9 10 3 3 2 27
(2.3%)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 0 1 4
(0.3%)
































HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FAILS
If one adopts the standard definition of plaintiff "success" to include jury
verdicts, settlements, and voluntary or stipulated dismissals, the plaintiffs in
my dataset succeeded in 682 (57.7%) cases.10 7 This success rate is similar to the
results of Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab's studies of non-prisoner
Section 1983 cases.10 s The remaining 42.3% of cases resolved in various ways:
256 (21.6%) were dismissed on motions to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings, at summary judgment, or at or after trial on grounds other than
qualified immunity; 173 (14.6%) were dismissed sua sponte before defendants
answered, dismissed as a sanction, or dismissed for failure to prosecute; and
thirty-seven (3.1%) were dismissed for other reasons or remain open. Thirty-
eight (3.2%) were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
My data do not capture how frequently qualified immunity influences
plaintiffs' decisions to settle, or how frequently cases are decided on qualified
immunity grounds even though other defenses are available. Instead, my data
reflect the frequency with which a grant of qualified immunity formally ends a
case. There is, once again, marked regional variation in the frequency with
which qualified immunity leads to the dismissal of Section 1983 actions.1 09 But
despite this regional variation, grants of qualified immunity motions infre-
quently end Section 1983 suits before discovery, and are infrequently the reason
suits are dismissed before trial.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
My findings undermine prevailing assumptions about the role qualified
immunity plays in the litigation of Section 1983 claims. Accordingly, in this
Part I consider the implications of my findings for ongoing discussions about
the proper scope of qualified immunity in relation to its underlying purposes.
First, I revisit empirical claims implicit in the Supreme Court's qualified im-
107. See id. at 812-13 n.13 (describing the common definition of plaintiff "success" in similar stud-
ies). Even those who adopt this standard definition recognize that it is likely over-
inclusive -at least some of these cases are settled or withdrawn on terms unfavorable to the
plaintiff See id. Note that I am including the three split verdicts in my count of plaintiff suc-
cesses.
108. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influ-
ence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 730
(1988) (finding that "[n]onprisoner constitutional tort cases succeed[ed] about half the
time" in their study of filings in three districts); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 682 (1987) (finding that
" [t] he success rate for counseled cases (which eliminates nearly all prisoner cases) is about
one-half" in their study of the Central District of California).
iog. See supra Table 12; see also infra text accompanying note 115 (describing this variation).
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munity decisions in light of my findings. Next, I consider why qualified im-
munity disposes of so few cases before trial. Armed with this more realistic ap-
praisal of qualified immunity's role, I argue that the Court has struck the
wrong balance between fairness and accountability for law enforcement offic-
ers. Finally, I suggest that qualified immunity doctrine should be adjusted to
comport with available evidence about the role the doctrine plays in constitu-
tional litigation.
A. Toward a More Accurate Description of Qualified Immunity's Role in
Constitutional Litigation
The Court's qualified immunity decisions paint a clear picture of the ways
in which the Court believes the doctrine should operate: it should be raised and
decided at the earliest possible stage of the litigation (at the motion to dismiss
stage if possible), it should be strong (protecting all but the plainly incompe-
tent or those who knowingly violate the law), and it should, therefore, protect
defendants from the time and distractions associated with discovery and trial in
insubstantial cases. Commentators similarly believe that qualified immunity is
often raised by defendants, usually granted by courts, and causes many cases to
be dismissed. 1 0
My study shows that, at least in filed cases, qualified immunity rarely func-
tions as expected. Defendants could not or did not need to raise qualified im-
munity in 17.3% of the 1,183 cases in my docket dataset, either because the cases
did not name individual defendants or seek monetary damages, or because the
cases were dismissed sua sponte by the court before the defendants had an op-
portunity to answer. Defendants raised qualified immunity in motions to dis-
miss and motions for judgment on the pleadings in only 13.9% of the cases in
which the defense could be raised."' Courts granted those motions on quali-
fied immunity grounds 9.1% of the time, but those grants were not always dis-
positive because additional claims or defendants remained, or because plaintiffs
were given the opportunity to amend. As a result, just seven of the 1,183 cases
in my docket dataset were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage on qualified
immunity grounds.
Qualified immunity more often prevented cases from proceeding past
summary judgment. Defendants were more likely to include qualified immuni-
11o. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
iii. There was a total of 979 cases in which qualified immunity could be raised, and defendants
raised motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings on qualified immunity grounds
in 136 of those cases. See supra Tables 2 & 3.
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ty in motions for summary judgment than in motions to dismiss, and courts
were more likely to grant summary judgment motions than motions to dismiss
on qualified immunity grounds.112 Moreover, courts of appeals reversed five
denials of summary judgment motions on interlocutory appeal and granted
qualified immunity in these cases. Yet qualified immunity motions at the sum-
mary judgment stage rarely shield government officials from discovery because
most summary judgment motions require at least some depositions or docu-
ment exchange." And grants of qualified immunity at summary judgment rel-
atively rarely achieved their goal of protecting government officials from trial -
such decisions by the district courts or courts of appeals disposed of plaintiffs'
cases just thirty-one times across the five districts in my study, amounting to
just 2.6% of the 1,183 cases in my dataset.
Qualified immunity is likely raised more often at or after trial than my data
suggest. But even if many more qualified immunity motions are made during
or after trial, and even if qualified immunity regularly convinces judges and ju-
ries to enter defense verdicts, qualified immunity would still fail to serve its ex-
pected role. Qualified immunity doctrine is intended to shield government offi-
cials from burdens associated with litigation and trial. A grant of qualified
immunity entered during or after trial has come too late to shield government
officials from these assumed burdens.
My data demonstrate considerable regional differences in the litigation and
adjudication of qualified immunity across the country. Scholars have observed
that the federal circuits interpret qualified immunity standards differently.114
112. See supra Table 4 (showing that 64.3% of qualified immunity motions were made at sum-
mary judgment); supra Table 8 (showing that 13.8% of qualified immunity motions made at
summary judgment were granted).
113. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
114. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 913, 925 (2015) ("One has to look hard to find some doctrinal consistency or
predictability in the case law and the circuits are hopelessly conflicted both within and
among themselves." (footnotes omitted)); Jeffries, supra note 6, at 852 ("[D]etermining
whether an officer violated 'clearly established' law has proved to be a mare's nest of com-
plexity and confusion. The circuits vary widely in approach, which is not surprising given
the conflicting signals from the Supreme Court"); Jeffries, supra note 61, at 250 n.151
("There is considerable variation among the circuits. The Ninth Circuit often construes
qualified immunity to favor plaintiffs and is often reversed for that reason. The Eleventh
Circuit leans so far in the other direction that it has been called the land of 'unqualified im-
munity."' (citations omitted)); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified
Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2015) (finding circuit variation in the frequency with
which the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits courts exercise their discretion under Pearson to
decide whether a constitutional violation occurred); Wilson, supra note 61, at 447-48 (de-
scribing variation in the ways circuit courts analyze whether the law is clearly established).
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My findings suggest that regional differences in qualified immunity doctrine
affect the decisions of courts and litigants. Defendants in the Southern District
of Texas and the Middle District of Florida were more likely to raise qualified
immunity than defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
Northern District of California; courts in the Southern District of Texas and
the Middle District of Florida were more likely to grant defendants' qualified
immunity motions than were judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Northern District of California; and grants of qualified immunity end-
ed more cases in the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Flor-
ida than in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of
California. But even in the Southern District of Texas-the district in my da-
taset most likely to dismiss cases on qualified immunity grounds-just 2.3% of
all suits were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the motion to dis-
miss stage, and 6.9% of all suits were dismissed at summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds." Unless the vast majority of law enforcement
officer defendants in the Southern District of Texas are "plainly incompetent"
or have "knowingly violate [d] the law,"'1 16 qualified immunity is not playing its
expected role even in the district in my dataset most sympathetic to the de-
fense.
Although qualified immunity is rarely the reason that Section 1983 cases
end, there are other ways in which qualified immunity doctrine might influ-
ence the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforcement. For exam-
ple, qualified immunity may discourage people from ever filing suit. Available
evidence suggests that just 1% of people who believe they have been harmed by
the police file lawsuits against law enforcement."' We do not know how fre-
quently qualified immunity doctrine plays a role in the decision not to sue. But
available evidence suggests that qualified immunity often factors into plaintiffs'
attorneys' decisions about whether to accept potential clients. When Alexander
Reinert interviewed plaintiffs' attorneys about qualified immunity in Bivens
cases, attorneys reported that "the qualified immunity defense play[s] a sub-
stantial role at the screening stage."" Attorneys described being discouraged
from accepting civil rights cases both because qualified immunity motions can
be difficult to defeat and because the costs and delays associated with litigating
qualified immunity can make the cases too burdensome to pursue." 9 But at-
115. See supra Table 12.
uS. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
117. See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 71, at 863.
11s. Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAs L.J. 477, 492 (2011).
ig. Id. at 492-94.
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torneys also described qualified immunity as one of many factors they consid-
ered when deciding whether to accept a case, and we do not know how attor-
neys weigh these different considerations.12 0
Even when cases are filed, qualified immunity may influence litigation deci-
sions in ways that are not easily observable through docket review. For exam-
ple, it may be that a pending qualified immunity motion will cause a plaintiff to
settle her claims. Consistent with this theory, seventy-five (17.0%) of the qual-
ified immunity motions in my dataset were never decided, presumably because
the parties settled while the motions were pending.121 Of the sixty-seven quali-
fied immunity interlocutory and final appeals in my dataset, twenty-three
(34.3%) were withdrawn or dismissed without decision, which suggests that
many of those cases settled while on appeal.122 When the Supreme Court has
described the ways in which it expects qualified immunity to shield govern-
ment officials from discovery and trial, it has never suggested that the doctrine
might serve this function by discouraging people from filing lawsuits or pursu-
ing their claims. But these are certainly ways in which qualified immunity
could achieve this goal.
A complete understanding of the frequency with which qualified immunity
protects government officials from discovery and trial would measure these
other potential litigation effects. For the time being, available evidence suggests
that qualified immunity may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to secure rep-
resentation and may encourage plaintiffs to settle, but it is infrequently the
formal reason that cases end.
B. Why Qualified Immunity Disposes of So Few Cases
The Supreme Court designed qualified immunity to protect "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."123 Why, then,
does it lead to the dismissal of so few cases? One possibility is that qualified
immunity doctrine discourages people from filing cases that are unlikely to
meet qualified immunity's exacting standard.124 But even if qualified immunity
120. Id.
121. See supra Table 6.
122. See supra Tables 9 & lo.
123. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
124. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text. For further discussion of selection effects, see
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1965 (2009);
and George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).
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has this selection effect, plaintiffs would continue to file cases in which quali-
fied immunity motions might be successful. Consistent with this theory, de-
fendants raised qualified immunity in more than one-third of the Section 1983
cases in which the defense could be asserted, and courts granted 51.4% of mo-
tions raising qualified immunity in full or part.125 Yet most of these motions to
dismiss and summary judgment motions raised multiple arguments, and
courts only granted 17.9% of these motions in part or whole on qualified im-
munity grounds. Ultimately, qualified immunity resulted in the dismissal of
only 3.9% of the cases in which the defense could be raised. Although the
threat of qualified immunity may cause some people not to sue, this selection
effect does not explain why qualified immunity plays such a limited role in the
resolution of motions raising qualified immunity and in the disposition of cases
that are filed.
The Supreme Court's decisions suggest another theory that could partially
explain why qualified immunity disposes of few cases: because courts improp-
erly deny defendants' qualified immunity motions. For this reason, and be-
cause of the "importance of qualified immunity 'to society as a whole,"' the Su-
preme Court has taken the unusual step of "often correct[ing] lower courts
when they wrongly subject individual officers to liability."126 Yet qualified im-
munity grant rates are lower than expected even in the circuits generally be-
lieved to be the most amenable to qualified immunity: 33.3% of motions raising
qualified immunity were granted in whole or part on qualified immunity
grounds in the Southern District of Texas, and 22.5% of motions raising quali-
fied immunity were granted in whole or part on qualified immunity grounds in
the Middle District of Florida.127 Moreover, only 9.2% of cases from the South-
ern District of Texas and 6.7% of cases from the Middle District of Florida were
actually dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Unless one believes that the
Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida, as well as the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, are regularly flouting the letter and spirit of the
Supreme Court's qualified immunity doctrine, error in the lower courts is an
unconvincing - or at least incomplete - explanation for these findings.
My data suggest two additional explanations for why qualified immunity
disposes of so few cases: the doctrine is not well suited to dismiss many claims
before trial, and qualified immunity is often unnecessary to serve its intended
role.
125. See supra Table 6.
126. City & Cry. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n-3 (2015) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
127. See supra Table 6.
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1. Qualified Immunity Is Ill Suited To Dispose of Cases
Qualified immunity motions are infrequently dispositive in part because
the doctrine is ill suited to dispose of many cases before trial. Although quali-
fied immunity doctrine creates a seemingly insurmountable barrier for plain-
tiffs, the standards for review at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment
stages may prevent courts from granting defendants' motions. At the motion to
dismiss stage, a defendant's qualified immunity motion should be denied so
long as the plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of a clearly established
right. As one district judge from the Middle District of Tennessee observed,
The rationale for the existence of qualified immunity is to avoid impos-
ing needless discovery costs upon government officials, so determining
whether the immunity applies must be made at an early stage in the lit-
igation. At the same time, the determination of qualified immunity is
usually dependent on the facts of the case, and, at the pleadings stage of
the litigation, there is scant factual record available to the court. Since
plaintiffs are not required to anticipate a qualified immunity defense in
their pleadings, and since at this stage of the litigation the exact con-
tours of the right at issue - and thus the degree to which it is clearly es-
tablished-are unclear, the Sixth Circuit advises that qualified immuni-
ty should usually be determined pursuant to a summary judgment
motion rather than a motion to dismiss. 12 8
This is a common refrain in circuit courts across the country1 29 and decisions in
my dataset. `0
128. Turner v. Weikal, No. 3:12-cV-0915, 2013 WL 3272481, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. June 27, 2013) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2015); Owens v. Balt. City State's
Attorneys' Office, 767 F.3 d 379, 396 ( 4 th Cir. 2014); Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App'x 788,
791 n-3 (3d Cir. 2009); Field Day, LLC v. Cry. of Suffolk, 463 F.3 d 167, 191-92 (2d Cir. 20o6);
St. George v. Pinellas Cry., 285 F.3 d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002); Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d
648, 651-52 (7 th Cir. 2001); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1976).
130. See, e.g., Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Dudley v. Borough of Upland, No. 2:12-
cv-5651 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2013), ECF No. 33 ("Without discovery, I cannot determine
whether the Officers acted reasonably. For instance, it is unclear what the Officers knew
about the warrant when they arrested Plaintiff and whether the warrant bore an expiration
date. Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it may have been
objectively unreasonable that the Officers failed to look into the validity of a 2 1 2-year-old
warrant. Accordingly, I cannot yet determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified
immunity." (citation omitted)); Report and Recommendation at is, Coldwater v. City of
Clute, No. 3:12-cV-0028 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 41 ("Accepting the allegations in
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District courts also find that factual disputes prevent resolution on qualified
immunity grounds at summary judgment. Alan Chen has argued that the Su-
preme Court's qualified immunity decisions "have embedded a central paradox
into the doctrine": although the Court repeatedly writes that "qualified im-
munity claims can and should be resolved at the earliest stages of litigation," it
ignores the fact that these determinations "inherently entail nuanced, fact-
sensitive, case-by-case determinations involving the application of general legal
principles to a particular context.""' My data offer anecdotal evidence to sup-
port Chen's observation. In the five districts in my study, courts repeatedly
found that factual disputes prevented summary judgment on qualified immun-
ity grounds. 13 2 In these decisions, courts duly recited the benefits of resolving
her Amended Complaint as true, the Court cannot conclude, at least at this juncture in the
litigation, that the conduct of these Defendants was objectively reasonable in the light of
then clearly established law."); Pippin v. Kirkland, No. 8:12-cv-0776, 2012 WL 12903175, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2012) ("[A]ccepting all factual allegations in the Complaint as true, it is
not possible to determine whether Defendant Kirkland is entitled to qualified immunity.");
Mantell v. Health Prof'ls Ltd., 5:11-cV-1034, 2012 WL 28469, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2012)
(" [T]he Court takes no stance on whether discovery will ultimately support these allega-
tions against any of the moving defendants and the issues may appropriately be revisited
during summary judgment practice in this matter. However, for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss, the complaint properly pleads deliberate indifference and precludes a finding of
qualified immunity at this time."); Nishi v. Cty. of Marin, No. 4:11-cv-0438, 2011 WL
1807043, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (" [R]esolution of the qualified immunity defense
frequently raises issues of fact that are more appropriately determined at a later stage. While
such a defense may thus very well prove viable at a future stage of these proceedings, it does
not present an adequate basis for dismissal here.").
131. Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 230 (20o6); see also
Jeffries, supra note 61, at 252-53.
132. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Reading, 118 F. Supp. 3d 751, 765-67 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ("[A]s the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently observed in a case involving a claim of exces-
sive force that arose out of the use of a Taser, 'if there are facts material to the determination
of reasonableness in dispute, then that issue of fact should be decided by the jury.' . . . Thus,
affording Defendant Errington qualified immunity at this time is inappropriate in light of
the genuine dispute between the parties of the facts bearing on his entitlement to immuni-
ty." (quoting Geist v. Ammary, 617 F. App'x 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2015))); Hayes v. City of Tam-
pa, No. 8:12-cv-2o38, 2014 WL 4954695, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2014) ("[C]onstruing the
record as a whole in favor of Hayes, whether Hayes's 'stance, demeanor and facial expres-
sion' justified Miller's use of a taser is a genuine issue of material fact."); McKissic v. Miller,
37 F. Supp. 3d 907, 918 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (" [W]hen the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff and
supported by some evidentiary materials, are taken to be true, there remains a question of
fact as to whether Officer Miller's actions constituted excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution."); Bui v. City of San Francisco, 61 F. Supp. 3d
877, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (" [B]ased on the evidence presented by both sides ... the court
cannot decide as a matter of law whether it would have been 'clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.' In these circumstances, the
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qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage and qualified immunity's in-
tended role as protection from discovery and trial. Yet the same courts found
that factual disputes made summary judgment inappropriate.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in White v. Pauly provides additional
anecdotal evidence of this underappreciated phenomenon. In White v. Pauly,
the Supreme Court held that it would be appropriate to grant summary judg-
ment on qualified immunity grounds to an officer who shot and killed a sus-
pect without first identifying himself and ordering the suspect to drop his gun,
because " [n]o settled Fourth Amendment principle requires that officer to sec-
ond-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instanc-
es like the one [the defendant] confronted here."' The decision has been de-
scribed as evidence that the Supreme Court "wants fewer lawsuits against
police to go forward."134 This may well be true. Yet the decision in White v.
Pauly did not end Daniel Pauly's lawsuit; as Justice Ginsburg notes in her con-
currence, the Court's decision "leaves open the propriety of denying summary
judgment" based on various factual disputes about the officer's conduct."'
Plaintiffs' decisions about how to frame their cases also make qualified im-
munity ill suited to dispose of many cases. Defendants could not raise a quali-
fied immunity defense in 8.4% of the cases in my study because the plaintiffs
did not sue an individual officer for money damages.13 6 Even in cases in which
defendants could raise qualified immunity, plaintiffs' other pleading decisions
sometimes diminished the impact of qualified immunity. In the vast majority
of cases asserting claims against individual officers for money damages, plain-
tiffs also included claims against municipalities, claims for injunctive relief,
and/or state law claims that could not be dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds."' Even when a plaintiff brings a claim for damages against an indi-
court denies Defendants' motion insofar as it asks the court conclude that the officers are en-
titled to qualified immunity." (citation omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202
(2001))); Nunez v. City of Corpus Christi, No. 2:12-cV-0092, 2013 WE 4040373, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 7, 2013) (denying qualified immunity because "there is considerable dispute re-
garding the timing of Hobbs' shots, the position of the vehicle at the time the shots were
fired, and the immediacy of the threat posed to Officer Hobbs").
133. 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
134. Feldman, supra note 5.
135. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
136. See supra Table 1.
137. In the Southern District of Texas, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 1o6 cases in
my dataset; in ninety-nine of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants.
In the Middle District of Florida, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 155 cases in
my dataset; in 149 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants. In the
Northern District of Ohio, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 139 cases in my da-
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vidual defendant (for which qualified immunity is available), the defendant
raises a qualified immunity defense, and the court grants the motion, claims
against the municipality, claims for injunctive relief, and state law claims may
remain.
2. Qualified Immunity Is Unnecessary To Dispose of Cases
My data also suggest that qualified immunity may lead to the dismissal of
few cases because cases are so often resolved on other grounds. Qualified im-
munity could not be raised in 126 (10.7%) of the cases in my study because the
judges dismissed the cases sua sponte before the defendants could answer or
otherwise respond."' In these cases, qualified immunity doctrine was unneces-
sary to shield defendants from discovery and trial.
Qualified immunity was also often unnecessary to dispose of cases at the
motion to dismiss stage. Defendants in the cases in my dataset clearly held this
view: even when defendants could raise qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage, they often chose not to do so. 140 More often than not, when de-
fendants moved to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, they did not in-
clude a qualified immunity argument. Instead, defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to plead plausible claims for relief or failure to assert a constitutional
violation, among other grounds. Even when defendants raised qualified im-
munity at the motion to dismiss stage, and courts concluded that the cases
should be dismissed, courts often resolved the motions on other grounds.
Courts granted, in whole or part, seventy-nine (51.3%) out of the 154 motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings that raised qualified immunity. Of
taset; in 129 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants. In the North-
ern District of California, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 219 cases in my da-
taset; in 209 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants. In the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 360 cases in my
dataset; in 357 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants.
138. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (providing examples of these cases from my
dataset).
139. See supra Table 12. In addition to the 1o5 cases dismissed sua sponte that were brought
against individual defendants, see supra Table 1, twenty-one cases brought against munici-
palities or seeking injunctive relief were also dismissed before defendants answered or oth-
erwise responded. These dismissals were most often based on the court's power to dismiss
frivolous pro se claims sua sponte, but others were dismissed at this early stage for failure to
prosecute or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cases dismissed for failure to prosecute or
remanded to state court after defendants responded to the complaints are counted separately
in Table 12.
140. See supra Figure 1; supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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those seventy-nine grants, twenty-one (26.6%) were granted on qualified im-
munity grounds, and fifty-eight (73.4%) were granted on grounds other than
qualified immunity.14 1
Qualified immunity played a more substantial role at summary judgment.
Defendants raised qualified immunity arguments in most of their summary
judgment motions.142 And when courts granted defendants' summary judg-
ment motions in whole or part, they relied on qualified immunity 39.7% of the
time.143 Still, courts decided a clear majority of the motions on other grounds.
Most often, these summary judgment motions were granted in whole or part
because the plaintiff could not establish a genuine dispute about a material
question of fact. This finding should not come as a surprise to at least one
member of the Court-Justice Kennedy noted in Wyatt v. Cole that the Court's
summary judgment decisions reduced the need for qualified immunity to
shield government officials from trial. As Justice Kennedy explained:
Harlow was decided at a time when the standards applicable to sum-
mary judgment made it difficult for a defendant to secure summary
judgment regarding a factual question such as subjective intent, even
when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the question; and in
Harlow we relied on that fact in adopting an objective standard for
qualified immunity. However, subsequent clarifications to summary-
judgment law have alleviated that problem .... Under the principles
set forth in Celotex and related cases, the strength of factual allegations
such as subjective bad faith can be tested at the summary-judgment
stage.144
When the Supreme Court discusses qualified immunity, it appears to pre-
sume that qualified immunity is the only barrier standing between government
officials and discovery and trial. Instead, my study illustrates that there are oth-
er tools that parties can- and often do - use to resolve Section 1983 cases before
trial.145
141. See supra Table 7. I include in the latter category cases where qualified immunity was the al-
ternate ground for decision and cases where the court's reasoning was unclear.
142. See supra Figure 2.
143. See supra Table 8. Summary judgment was granted in whole or in part 146 times. Of those
cases, the court relied on qualified immunity fifty-eight times.
144. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
145. Accord Fallon, supra note 59, at 504-05 (observing that other mechanisms can be used to
achieve the goals of qualified immunity).
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In this Section, I have offered some possible explanations for why cases are
infrequently dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. This phenomenon is
not solely attributable to plaintiffs' decisions not to file cases in which qualified
immunity motions might be successful. Nor can lower courts be shouldered
with all the blame for the low rate of qualified immunity dispositions. Instead,
my data suggest that qualified immunity doctrine is ill suited in some cases and
unnecessary in others to serve its intended role.
My data also make clear that qualified immunity's role in Section 1983 liti-
gation is the product of decisions made by multiple actors -judges, defendants,
plaintiffs, and the litigants' attorneys. Moreover, there is at least some evidence
to suggest that district judges' varying inclinations to grant qualified immunity
motions may influence defendants' and plaintiffs' litigation decisions. In juris-
dictions with judges who most often granted defendants' qualified immunity
motions -the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida -
defendants brought qualified immunity motions more frequently, and plaintiffs
more frequently crafted their cases in ways that prevented defendants from
raising the defense. Conversely, in jurisdictions with judges who less frequently
granted defendants' qualified immunity motions-the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Northern District of California- defendants less fre-
quently brought qualified immunity motions, and plaintiffs less frequently
crafted their cases to avoid the defense. A complete understanding of the role of
qualified immunity in constitutional litigation against law enforcement must
attend to regional differences in the dynamic interactions between judges, de-
fendants, and plaintiffs. I plan to explore these interactions in future work.
C. Implications for the Balance Struck by Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court has explained that qualified immunity is intended to
balance "the need to hold government officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distrac-
tion, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."" 6 Many have ar-
gued, and I agree, that the Court's qualified immunity doctrine puts a heavy
thumb on the scale in favor of government interests, and disregards the inter-
ests of individuals whose rights have been violated.147 My research offers an
additional reason to believe that the Supreme Court has gotten the balance
wrong: qualified immunity doctrine does not appear to be necessary or well
146. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
147. See, e.g., Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 8 (criticizing the Court's qualified im-
munity jurisprudence along these lines); Reinhardt, supra note 7 (same).
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suited to protect government officials "from harassment, distraction, and liabil-
ity when they perform their duties reasonably."148 This observation makes it
even more difficult to justify the burdens the doctrine appears to place on
plaintiffs.
1. Interests in Protecting Government Officials
The Supreme Court explained in Harlow that qualified immunity was nec-
essary to protect government officials from four harms: 1) "the expenses of liti-
gation"; 2) "the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues"; 3)
"the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties"'; and 4) "the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance
of public office."149 The Court has relied on no empirical evidence to support its
conclusions that these threats exist, or that qualified immunity can protect
against them. Although questions remain about the government interests
served by qualified immunity, this study and my prior research suggest that
qualified immunity doctrine is often unfit to protect against some of these
harms, and often unnecessary to protect against others.
The first -and frequently repeated-justification for qualified immunity is
that it protects government officials from the burdens of financial liability. But
my prior research has shown that qualified immunity is unnecessary to serve
this role-virtually all law enforcement defendants are provided with counsel
free of charge, and are indemnified for settlements and judgments entered
against them. In the six-year period from 20o6 to 2011, law enforcement offic-
ers in forty-four of the seventy largest law enforcement agencies paid just
0.02% of the dollars awarded to plaintiffs in police misconduct suits.`0 In thir-
ty-seven small and midsized agencies, no officer contributed to settlements or
judgments to plaintiffs awarded during this period. Officers were indemnified
even when they were disciplined, fired, and criminally prosecuted for their mis-
conduct. And no officer paid a penny of the punitive damages awarded to
plaintiffs in these jurisdictions. I could confirm only two jurisdictions in which
officers contributed to settlements and judgments during the study period-
New York City and Cleveland."' In these jurisdictions, the median contribu-
148. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
149. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
150. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 890.
151. See id. at 926-29. An officer was not indemnified for a $300 punitive damages judgment in
Los Angeles, but the officer never paid the award. And officials believed - but could not con-
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tion was $2,250, and no officer contributed more than $25,000.152 Given this
evidence, qualified immunity cannot be justified as a means of protecting offic-
ers from personal financial liability.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has described "the 'driving force' be-
hind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine" to be resolving "'insubstan-
tial claims' against government officials . .. prior to discovery."s3 But qualified
immunity resulted in the dismissal of just o.6% of the cases in my dataset be-
fore discovery, and resulted in the dismissal of just 3.2% of the 1,183 cases in my
dataset before trial.
Indeed, qualified immunity may actually increase the costs and delays asso-
ciated with Section 1983 litigation. Although qualified immunity terminated
only 3.9% of the 979 cases in my dataset in which qualified immunity could be
raised, the defense was in fact raised by defendants in more than 37% of these
cases-and was sometimes raised multiple times, at the motion to dismiss
stage, at summary judgment, and through interlocutory appeals.1 5 4 Each time
qualified immunity is raised, it must be researched, briefed, and argued by the
parties and decided by the judge. And litigating qualified immunity is no small
feat. John Jeffries describes qualified immunity doctrine as "a mare's nest of
complexity and confusion.""5 Lower courts are "hopelessly conflicted both
within and among themselves" as a result. 15 6 One circuit court judge reported
that " [w] ading through the doctrine of qualified immunity is one of the most
morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges rou-
tinely face." 1 7
The time and effort necessary to resolve qualified immunity motions could
nevertheless further the goals of qualified immunity doctrine if it effectively
protected defendants from discovery and trial. But in the five districts in my
study, just 8.6% of qualified immunity motions brought by defendants in my
docket dataset resulted in case dismissals. 58 The remaining 91.4% of qualified
immunity motions brought by defendants required the parties and judges to
firm-that employees of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and the Illinois State Police may
each have been required to contribute to one settlement during the study period.
152. Id. at 939.
153. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 64o n.2 (1987)).
154. See supra Tables 4 & 5.
155. Jeffries, supra note 6, at 852.
156. Blum, supra note 114, at 925 (footnotes omitted).
157. Wilson, supra note 61, at 447; see also Blum, supra note 114, at 945-46 (quoting two judges'
descriptions of the complexities of determining whether a law is clearly established).
is8. See supra Table 11 (thirty-eight of the 440 qualified immunity motions raised by defendants
resulted in case dismissals).
6o
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dedicate time and resources to briefing, arguing, and deciding the motions
without shielding defendants from discovery and trial.
Even in the cases in which qualified immunity motions resulted in case
dismissals, it is far from certain that qualified immunity saved the parties and
the courts time. As Alan Chen has observed, when considering the efficiencies
of qualified immunity, "the costs eliminated by resolving the case prior to trial
must be compared to the costs of trying the case . . . . [T]he pretrial litigation
costs caused by the invoking of the immunity defense may cancel out the trial
costs saved by that defense.""' In this study, I have not calculated how much
time was spent litigating qualified immunity motions, or compared that time
with the amount of time spent preparing for and conducting a trial. Yet- given
the complexity of qualified immunity doctrine, the use of interlocutory appeals
of qualified immunity denials, the fact that most trials in my docket dataset
lasted just a few days, and the possibility that a case will settle instead of going
to trial even when qualified immunity is denied-the aggregate benefits of
qualified immunity do not necessarily outweigh its costs for government offi-
cials.
In Pearson, the Supreme Court wrote that the Saucier two-step qualified
immunity analysis "'disserve [s] the purpose of qualified immunity' when it
'forces the parties to endure additional burdens of suit -such as the costs of lit-
igating constitutional questions and delays attributable to resolving them-
when the suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily."'16 0 Given the costs
and delays associated with qualified immunity motion practice and the infre-
quency with which qualified immunity motions terminate Section 1983 cases,
the doctrine arguably disserves its own purposes.
Although qualified immunity doctrine appears to do little to shield defend-
ants from burdens associated with litigation in filed cases - and may in fact in-
crease the amount of time spent on a substantial number of those cases -my
data leave open the possibility that qualified immunity doctrine shields gov-
ernment officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial in other
ways, namely by causing people never to file insubstantial claims or to settle
them quicldy.16 1 The possibility that qualified immunity doctrine serves its in-
tended purpose in these ways, however, does not mean that it actually does. At
159. Chen, supra note 57, at loo.
16o. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Na-
tional Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pear-
son, 555 U.S. 223 (No. 07-751)).
161. See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text (discussing case selection and settlement be-
havior effects).
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least two pressing questions would have to be answered before qualified im-
munity doctrine could be justified on these grounds.
First, what are the merits of cases that are never filed or settled quicldy be-
cause of qualified immunity? If qualified immunity doctrine discourages people
from filing or pursuing insubstantial cases, the doctrine is meeting its express
goals.162 But if the doctrine discourages people from filing or pursuing merito-
rious cases because the briefing and interlocutory appeals associated with qual-
ified immunity would be too expensive, the doctrine is not sorting cases in the
way anticipated by the Court. Although more research is necessary to answer
this question, available evidence offers reason for concern. Alexander Reinert's
interviews with attorneys who bring Bivens actions suggest that people with
strong claims may sometimes be unable to find a lawyer because the cost of lit-
igating qualified immunity is too high or because the conduct at issue has not
been clearly established by prior cases.163 Some people who do file their cases
may settle at a discount, not because their cases are weak but because they can-
not afford to litigate qualified immunity in the district court or on interlocutory
appeal.
Second, how frequently does qualified immunity cause plaintiffs not to file
or to settle insubstantial cases? The costs associated with litigating qualified
immunity and the difficulty of overcoming a qualified immunity motion may
cause plaintiffs not to file some insubstantial cases. But other, independent
considerations may cause plaintiffs not to file such cases, including rigorous
pleading requirements, stringent standards for proving underlying constitu-
tional violations, and minimal potential damages awards. Without further
study, it is not possible to conclude that qualified immunity, rather than these
alternative considerations, is responsible for plaintiffs' decisions to settle or
never file insubstantial cases.
In short, there is limited evidence to support the hypothesis that qualified
immunity serves its purpose through screening cases or coercing settlement.
Indeed, some evidence suggests that the doctrine may be discouraging plain-
tiffs from filing or pursuing meritorious cases because qualified immunity
would take too long or cost too much to litigate. Our existing knowledge about
qualified immunity's effects on filing and settlement decisions cannot justify
the doctrine on these grounds.
The Supreme Court has mentioned, but dwelled little upon, two other pos-
sible benefits of qualified immunity doctrine-that it lessens "the danger that
162. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (discussing qualified immunity's goal
of preventing "insubstantial claims" from proceeding to trial).
163. See Reinert, supra note 118, at 491-95.
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fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their du-
ties"' and that it mitigates "the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office."164 The available evidence casts doubt on these rationales as well.
The Court has written that dangers of overdeterrence should dissipate for offi-
cials who are not financially responsible for settlements and judgments.165
Consistent with this observation, studies have found that "the prospect of civil
liability has a deterrent effect in the abstract survey environment but that it
does not have a major impact on field practices."166 Further, civil liability does
not appear to play a sizable role in people's decisions to apply to become police
officers. Police departments around the country report difficulties finding re-
cruits, but the long list of reasons police officials believe people are not apply-
ing does not include the threat of being sued. 16 7 These speculative benefits
cannot justify qualified immunity's highly restrictive standards.
Perhaps the Court believes that qualified immunity doctrine serves other
interests that it has failed to mention. Even if officers are almost always indem-
nified, and cases are rarely dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, qualified
164. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949)).
165. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1980) (explaining that the overdeter-
rence rationale for qualified immunity "loses its force" when "the threat of personal liability
is removed").
166. VICTORE. IPPELER, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 7 (4 th ed. 20o6) (citing sev-
eral studies); see also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 942-43 (discussing studies of civil liability as
a deterrent to aggressive police behaviors).
167. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Nick Penzenstadler, Police Redouble Efforts To Recruit Diverse
Officers, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/o1
/21/police-redoubling-efforts-to-recruit-diverse-officers/21574081 [http://perma.cc/4MFX
-3ZE9]; Edmund DeMarche, 'Who Needs This?' Police Recruits Abandon Dream Amid Anti-
Cop Climate, Fox NEws (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2o15/o9/o2/who
-needs-this-police-recruits-abandon-dream-amid-anti-cop-climate.html [http://perma.cc
/DAC4-EQR3]; Daniel Denvir, Who Wants To Be a Police Officer?, CITYLAB (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/04/who-wants-to-be-a-police-officer/391017 [http://
perma.cc/RB27-LEUZ]; Mori Kessler, Thinning Blue Line: Police See Declines in Applicants,
ST. GEORGE NEws (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.stgeorgeutah.com/news/archive/2015/12/13
/mgk-thinning-blue-line-police-decline [http://perma.cc/L2ENVRE2]; Oliver Yates Libaw,
Police Face Severe Shortage of Recruits, ABC NEws (July 10, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com
/US/story?id=96570 [http://perma.cc/NJ27-866M]; John Vibes, Surprised? Some Police De-
partments Experiencing Sharp Decline in New Applicants, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Feb.
20, 2015), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/good-news-areas-find-people-police [http://
perma.cc/7KFB-RABB]; William J. Woska, Police Officer Recruitment: A Public-Sector Crisis,
POLICE CHIEF (Apr. 2016), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/police-officer-recruitment
-a-public-sector-crisis [http://perma.cc/S57T-5T5N].
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immunity doctrine may somehow reduce the costs of litigation for the munici-
palities that end up paying the settlements and judgments on behalf of their
officers.168 Qualified immunity doctrine may encourage the development of
constitutional law because it allows courts to announce new constitutional
rules without fear of subjecting defendants to financial liability.169 In this Arti-
cle, I do not evaluate the sensibility of-or empirical support for-these alter-
native justifications for qualified immunity. Neither has been relied upon by
the Court. If these or other policy interests motivate the Supreme Court's qual-
ified immunity jurisprudence, the Court should be explicit about those motiva-
tions so that courts, practitioners, and scholars can evaluate the sensibility of
these interests and measure the extent to which qualified immunity advances
them. Until then, we are left with the justifications for qualified immunity doc-
trine that the Court has offered. Available evidence suggests that the doctrine is
unnecessary to serve some of qualified immunity's key goals and ill suited for
others.
2. Interests in Government Accountability
My research indicates that filed lawsuits are rarely dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds. As I have argued, this finding suggests that qualified im-
munity doctrine rarely achieves its intended function as a shield for govern-
ment officials against discovery and trial in filed cases. What are the implica-
tions of this finding for the other side of qualified immunity's balance,
described by the Court both as "the importance of a damages remedy to protect
the rights of citizens"170 and as "the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly"?"' Commentators have long criticized
qualified immunity doctrine for protecting government officials at the expense
of Section 1983's accountability goals. If qualified immunity is not doing much
to protect government officials, does that allay concerns that the doctrine com-
promises government accountability? In other words, do my data suggest that
qualified immunity does little of great significance, either to defendants' benefit
or to plaintiffs' detriment?
168. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 856 (2007).
169. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 61, at 247 ("Limitations on money damages facilitate constitu-
tional evolution and growth by reducing the cost of innovation. Judges contemplating an
affirmation of constitutional rights need not worry about the financial fallout.").
170. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
504-05 (1978)).
171. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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Evidence that few cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds sug-
gests that the direst descriptions of qualified immunity's impact on plaintiffs
perhaps go too far. Critics assert that qualified immunity closes the courthouse
door for plaintiffs.172 And there is no shortage of decisions by the Supreme
Court and lower courts dismissing cases on qualified immunity grounds.7
Yet, my study suggests that qualified immunity doctrine appears to close the
courthouse door far less frequently than critics have assumed- at least once a
case is filed. My findings do not, however, undermine other concerns raised
about the impact of qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claims. Qualified immun-
ity could significantly damage law enforcement accountability without protect-
ing officials from the burdens of discovery and trial.
First, qualified immunity doctrine may discourage people from filing their
cases or may cause them to settle or withdraw their claims.174 If qualified im-
munity had this effect only on insubstantial cases, the doctrine would be
achieving its intended role, albeit in a manner unexpected by the Court. But if
qualified immunity is causing people not to file or to settle meritorious cases, as
available anecdotal evidence suggests, then the doctrine is preventing people
from vindicating their rights and holding government accountable.1 75
Moreover, my findings do not undermine other common critiques of the
doctrine. Qualified immunity doctrine has been criticized by courts and schol-
ars alike for being confusing and difficult to apply, and leading to inconsistent
adjudications. 176 These characteristics of qualified immunity doctrine may well
increase the time it takes courts to decide qualified immunity motions, even as
the decisions are infrequently dispositive.1 7 7
In addition, many are critical of the Court's decision in Pearson to allow
lower courts to grant qualified immunity without first assessing whether a de-
fendant violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiff. 17 Their
fear is that if courts regularly find that the law is not clearly established without
first ruling on the scope of the underlying constitutional right, the constitu-
172. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
177. See Chen, supra note 57, at 99 ("Plaintiffs, defendants, and trial courts are likely to expend
substantial resources simply litigating the qualified immunity defense -an elaborate side-
show, independent of the merits, that in many cases will do little to advance or accelerate
resolution of the legal claims.").
178. See supra Section I.B.2 (describing Pearson).
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tional right at issue will never become clearly established. This catch-22 may
lead to constitutional uncertainty and stagnation, making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail on constitutional claims and offering little guidance to gov-
ernment officials about the scope of constitutional rights."' Scholars who have
studied the impact of Pearson have found some evidence to support these con-
cerns.`0 The fact that few cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds
is immaterial to this critique. The Supreme Court's decision in Pearson to allow
lower courts to grant qualified immunity without deciding whether a right has
been violated may still lead to constitutional uncertainty, particularly in cases
involving new technologies or practices."'
Finally, many have argued that the Supreme Court's qualified immunity de-
cisions protect bad actors. The Court's disregard of subjective intent protects
officers who act in bad faith, so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established law.182 In addition, a government official who has acted in a clearly
unconstitutional manner can be shielded from liability simply because no prior
case has held similar conduct to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's re-
179. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIo ST. J.
ClM. L. 463, 502-o6 (2009); Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional
Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 139, 149; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order ofBattle in
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120; James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified
Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1601, 1605-o6 (2011).
18o. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 114; see also Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wil-
son-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, So U. COLO. L. REV. 401,
428 & n.121 (2009) (predicting that Pearson will lead to constitutional stagnation); Colin
Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468 (2011) (finding
that after Pearson district courts often answered both steps of the qualified immunity analy-
sis, but circuit courts more often decided qualified immunity motions without ruling on the
underlying constitutional right); cf Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson
in the Circuits, So FORDHAM L. REv. 623, 629 (2011) (finding that circuit courts followed the
Saucier two-step process "most of the time").
181. See, e.g., Matthew Slaughter, First Amendment Right To Record Police: When Clearly Estab-
lished Law Is Not Clear Enough, 49 J. MARsHAIL L. REv. 101 (2015) (describing circuit varia-
tion in analysis of the right to record the police); Bailey Jennifer Woolfstead, Don't Tase Me
Bro: A Lack of Jurisdictional Consensus Across Circuit Lines, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 285 (2012)
(describing circuit variation in analysis of qualified immunity for claims involving electronic
control devices).
182. For example, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Supreme Court held that the then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity, even though he authorized federal prose-
cutors to use the material-witness statute pretextually, because qualified immunity doctrine
"demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the mo-
tive of the arresting officer.' 563 U.S. 731, 740 (2011).
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cent decisions have made it increasingly difficult to meet this standard.' It is,
as John Jeffries has written, "as if the one-bite rule for bad dogs started over
with every change in weather conditions." 84 Even this critique of qualified
immunity is left largely intact by my findings. Qualified immunity's disregard
for officials' subjective intent, and the need for precedent that "place [s] the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,"' may insulate bad actors
from financial liability, but still expose them to discovery and trial if other
claims or defendants remain.
McKay v. City of Hayward,18 6 a case from the Northern District of California
in my docket dataset, illustrates how qualified immunity can impair govern-
ment accountability in these ways without shielding defendants from discovery
or trial. On May 29, 2011, officers from the Hayward Police Department used a
police dog to track an armed suspect who had robbed a restaurant.1 7 The dog
guided the officers to an eight-foot wall. Without any warning, the officers lift-
ed the dog over the wall. On the other side of the wall was the backyard of a
mobile home belonging to Jesse Porter, an 89-year-old who had no connection
to the robbery. The dog bit Porter on the leg, leaving a wound so severe that
Porter's leg had to be amputated. Mr. Porter was then moved into a residential
183. Despite the confusion in the doctrine, the Supreme Court's most recent decisions suggest
that it is very difficult to show that conduct violates "clearly established law." Although the
Court once held that the obviousness of a constitutional violation can defeat qualified im-
munity even without a case on point, see Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), in recent years
the Court's primary focus has been whether a prior court has held the right to be clearly es-
tablished, see Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 652-53. The Court's recent
decisions have made it difficult to clearly establish the law in other ways as well. In 1999, the
Court explained that a plaintiff could show the law was clearly established by pointing to
"controlling authority in their jurisdiction" or a "consensus of cases of persuasive authority."
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). Yet in more recent decisions, the Court has
backed away from this position; it now only assumes for the sake of argument that controlling
circuit authority or a consensus of cases of persuasive authority can clearly establish the law.
See Kinports, supra note 2, at 70-71 (describing this shift in the law). The Court's most re-
cent decisions also suggest that the facts of the prior decision must closely resemble those of
the instant case. The Court has repeatedly assured plaintiffs that it "do[es] not require a case
directly on point," but requires that "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate'" Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per cu-
riam) (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). In recent years, the Court has reversed several lower
court decisions for relying on prior precedent that established constitutional principles at
too-general a level. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017); Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. 305.
184. Jeffries, supra note 61, at 256.
185. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
186. No. 3:12-cV-1613 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012).
187. The facts of the case are taken from the district court's summary judgment decision. See
McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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care facility, where he died two months later. Mr. Porter's children sued the in-
volved officers and the City of Hayward under federal and state law.
At summary judgment, the district court in McKay granted the officers
qualified immunity.' The court found that, to survive summary judgment,
the plaintiffs had to be able to show that the failure to warn before seizure by a
police dog constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. The court surveyed
Ninth Circuit cases involving police dogs and found that " [n] o Ninth Circuit
case holds explicitly that failure to warn before seizure by a police dog consti-
tutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment."" The court surveyed other cir-
cuits and found some variation: the Fourth and Eighth Circuits had held that
the failure to give a warning before using a police dog violates the Fourth
Amendment, but the Eleventh, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had held that fail-
ure to warn before deploying a police dog was "not dispositive of the reasona-
bleness of seizing an individual with a police dog."o90 Because of this variation
among circuits, the court in the Northern District of California concluded that
that the unconstitutionality of the officers' conduct had not been clearly estab-
lished.
The decision granting qualified immunity in McKay did not shield gov-
ernment officials from burdens associated with either discovery or trial. In
McKay's case, qualified immunity was raised at summary judgment, after the
officers had already participated in discovery. The motion was granted less than
two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin.'9 Moreover, even after the
court granted qualified immunity to the individual officers, the officers still
faced the prospect of trial. In addition to the Section 1983 claims against the
two individual officers, the plaintiffs brought state law claims against the indi-
vidual officers and state and federal claims against the City -the qualified im-
munity defense did not apply to any of these claims.1 92 In the days following
the court's summary judgment decision, the parties drafted and submitted voir
dire questions, multiple motions in limine, and briefs regarding whether the
188. Id. at 985.
189. Id. at 983.
190. Id. at 984.
191. See Case Management Minutes, McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971 (No. 3:12-cV-1613), ECF No.
67.
192. McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 985, 988.
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trial should be separated into three stages." The case settled and the court en-
tered a conditional dismissal the day trial was scheduled to begin.194
Although the district court's qualified immunity decision in McKay did not
shield officials from discovery and was not formally the reason the case did not
go to trial, it did negatively affect interests in government accountability. The
qualified immunity motion likely increased the amount of time spent by the at-
torneys for the plaintiffs and defendants." The grant of qualified immunity in
McKay may also have ripple effects that extend far beyond the parties to the lit-
igation. The district court found that it was not clearly established in the Ninth
Circuit that deploying police dogs without a prior warning violates the Consti-
tution. This decision may cause lawyers to decline to represent people with
similar claims. One could argue that qualified immunity is serving its intended
role by discouraging people from bringing Section 1983 cases when the under-
lying constitutional rights have not been clearly established. But this position
goes further than the Court's own justification for qualified immunity doctrine:
to protect government officials from insubstantial claims.1 96 That no prior
court has decided a given constitutional issue does not imply that a case raising
it lacks merit.
Uncertainty about the constitutionality of deploying a police dog without a
prior warning may also influence police departments' policy and training deci-
sions. Although the Supreme Court appears confident that police departments
can regulate themselves," police officials look to court decisions to guide their
policies and trainings. 98 Were, for example, the Ninth Circuit to hold that
193. See McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971 (No. 3:12-Cv-1613), ECF Nos. 76-79.
194. See Order of Conditional Dismissal, McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971 (No. 3:12-Cv-1613), ECF
No. 81.
195. In some cases, the grant of qualified immunity might cause plaintiffs to settle instead of go-
ing to trial or cause plaintiffs to settle for an amount smaller than they would have otherwise
accepted. In this case, the plaintiffs' attorney reported that the qualified immunity grant had
a "negligible" impact on the value of the case because the Monell claim remained and,
" [u]nlike many civil rights cases, [the plaintiffs] had good evidence to support the Monell
claim'" E-mail from Matthew D. Davis, Attorney for Plaintiffs in McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d
971, to author (Nov. 28, 2016, 9:17 AM) (on file with author).
196. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. Soo, 815-16 (1982) (discussing qualified immunity's goal
of preventing "insubstantial claims" from proceeding to trial).
197. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (20o6) (asserting that the rise of police
professionalism and internal discipline reduces the need for the exclusionary rule to deter
police misbehavior).
198. For examples of instances in which court decisions have influenced police department poli-
cies and trainings, see POLICE EXEc. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
USE OF FORCE 18 (Mar. 2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/3o%2oguiding
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officers should give prior warnings before using police dogs, departments in
the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit would likely train their officers to issue
warnings under these circumstances. Without such a decision, and with the
McKay court's conclusion that there is no clearly established constitutional
right to such a warning, departments may be less likely to train their officers to
give such warnings.'99 These costs to government accountability accrue wheth-
er or not qualified immunity protects government officials from discovery and
trial.
D. Moving Forward
The Supreme Court has written that evidence undermining its assumptions
about the realities of constitutional litigation might "justify reconsideration of
the balance struck" in its qualified immunity decisions.2 00 My research has, in-
deed, undermined the Court's assumptions about the purposes served by qual-
ified immunity doctrine. In this Section, I consider how these findings should
shape qualified immunity doctrine moving forward.
My findings suggest that the Court's efforts to advance its policy goals
through qualified immunity doctrine has been an exercise in futility. In Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court "completely reformulated qualified immunity
along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry
into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective
inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action."2 01 The Court be-
lieved that "[tihe transformation was justified by the special policy concerns
arising from public officials' exposure to repeated suits."'202 Some-including
Justice Thomas -have argued that this transformation was a mistake because
the scope of qualified immunity doctrine should mirror the common law de-
%20principles.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9YU-C4UA] (explaining that after the Fourth Circuit
held that using a Taser repeatedly in drive-stun mode was unconstitutional, "several agen-
cies in jurisdictions covered by the Fourth Circuit ruling amended their use-of-force and
ECW [Electronic Control Weapons] policies" in response to the decision); and Joanna C.
Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. L.F. 437, 452n1.53,455 n.68.
199. See David Alan Sldansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIo ST. J. ClM. L. 567, 58o-81
(2008) (observing that, when a United States Supreme Court decision removed the exclu-
sionary rule as a remedy for conduct that violated California constitutional law -searching
garbage without a warrant-police in California were "trained to ignore" California law).
200. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 n-3 (1987).
201. Id. at 645 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20).
202. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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fenses that existed in 1871, and should not reflect the Court's policy preferences
at all.2 0 3
This Article offers an additional reason to conclude this transformation was
a mistake: the doctrine does not serve its intended policy objectives. Although
the Supreme Court repeatedly describes qualified immunity doctrine as a
means of shielding government officials from the costs and burdens of litiga-
tion, I have found officers are virtually always indemnified, and that qualified
immunity is rarely the reason that Section 1983 cases end. Future research can
explore whether qualified immunity causes plaintiffs not to file or pursue in-
substantial claims, or advances the doctrine's goals in other ways. At this point,
however, available evidence contradicts the Court's assumptions about the role
qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation.
Justices sympathetic to qualified immunity's policy goals might conclude
based on my findings that they should further strengthen qualified immunity
doctrine to protect defendants. I would discourage this approach for several
reasons. First, it is far from clear that qualified immunity doctrine is well de-
signed to weed out only "insubstantial" cases. Available evidence suggests that
some people may decline to file or pursue their claims because of the cost of lit-
igating qualified immunity, even when they might succeed on the merits.204
And cases alleging clearly unconstitutional behavior may be dismissed on qual-
ified immunity grounds simply because no prior case has held sufficiently simi-
lar conduct to be unconstitutional.2 05 Strengthening qualified immunity doc-
trine would presumably aggravate these preexisting concerns.
Setting aside the question of whether such a shift is desirable, I am not
convinced that it is feasible. It is hard to imagine how the Court could make
qualified immunity doctrine any stronger than it already is.206 Perhaps mem-
bers of the Court believe that lower courts are not applying qualified immunity
doctrine as expansively as they should. Indeed, the Court's flurry of recent
203. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) ("Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law
backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in 'inter-
pret[ing] the intent of Congress in enacting' the Act.... Our qualified immunity precedents
instead represent precisely the sort of 'freewheeling policy choice[s]' that we have previously
disclaimed the power to make." (citations omitted)).
204. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
2o6. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (describing recent shifts in the doctrine).
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summary reversals suggests that it is attempting to encourage lower courts to
follow course.207
But even if all judges applied qualified immunity doctrine as expansively as
does the Supreme Court, qualified immunity doctrine would likely still fall
short of its intended role in many cases filed against law enforcement. Plaintiffs
could often still plead a plausible entitlement to relief at the motion to dismiss
stage, and could often still raise factual disputes at summary judgment that
prevent dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs would continue to
include claims against municipalities, claims for declaratory or injunctive relief,
and state law claims in their cases that qualified immunity cannot resolve.208
Defendants would still sometimes conclude that other defenses or an inexpen-
sive settlement is preferable to the added costs of qualified immunity motion
practice. And courts would continue to dismiss cases for multiple other reasons
besides qualified immunity. Presumably the number of cases dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds would increase somewhat, but given litigation dy-
namics and other applicable doctrines, many cases would remain in which
qualified immunity never shielded government officials from discovery or trial.
Qualified immunity is the Supreme Court's hammer. But many civil rights
damages actions against law enforcement are not nails.
The fact that qualified immunity is often ill suited and unnecessary to ad-
vance the Court's policy objectives provides additional reason to adopt Justice
Thomas's view and realign the doctrine with historical common law defenses.
According to those who have studied the common law at the time Section 1983
was passed, little would remain of qualified immunity if the Court adopted this
approach.2 09 But other defenses would remain- including arguments that
207. See Baude, supra note 3 (commenting on numerous summary reversals by the Supreme
Court).
208. The Court could conceivably hold that qualified immunity can be asserted by municipalities
and in claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. But the Court has already held that quali-
fied immunity does not apply to both types of claims. And the Court has no power to create
a qualified immunity defense for state claims.
209. For discussion of the common law and government practices in place when Section 1983 be-
came law, see Alschuler, supra note 179, at 5o6 ("A justice who favored giving § 1983 its orig-
inal meaning or who sought to restore the remedial regime favored by the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment could not have approved of either Pierson or Harlow."); Baude, supra
note 3, at 1 (observing that qualified immunity is justified as "deriv[ing] from a common
law 'good faith' defense,' but that " [t] here was no such defense"); James E. Pfander & Jona-
than L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability
in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1862, 1924 (2010) ("During the early republic, the
courts-state and federal-did not take responsibility for adjusting the incentives of officers
or for protecting them from the burdens of litigation and personal liability. These were mat-
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plaintiffs cannot state plausible claims for relief in their complaint or cannot
establish material factual disputes at summary judgment. Defendants would
still be able to argue that plaintiffs cannot meet the Court's exceedingly rigor-
ous standards for constitutional violations.210 Even in the absence of qualified
immunity, these other procedural and substantive barriers would prevent many
Section 1983 cases from being filed, proceeding to discovery, or advancing to
trial.
If the Court is unwilling to eliminate or dramatically restrict qualified im-
munity, it could make more modest alterations that would align the doctrine
with evidence of its role in constitutional litigation. For example, the Court
could undo adjustments to qualified immunity doctrine that were expressly
motivated by an interest in shielding government officials from discovery and
trial in filed cases. In Harlow, the Court eliminated consideration of officers'
subjective intent because it believed doing so would "avoid 'subject[ing] gov-
ernment officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery' in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violat-
ed were not clearly established at the time."211 My study shows that the Court's
elimination of the subjective prong of qualified immunity in Harlow should be
viewed as a failed experiment. Despite courts' and commentators' assumptions
to the contrary,2 12 the decision in Harlow appears to have done little to shield
government officials from discovery and trial in filed cases.
Restoring the subjective prong to qualified immunity analysis could also
mitigate at least one serious concern with the doctrine. Currently, government
officials acting in bad faith or with knowledge of the unconstitutionality of
their behavior can be shielded from liability simply because no prior case pro-
scribed their conduct. If the subjective prong were restored to the qualified
immunity analysis, government officials would not be entitled to qualified im-
munity if they knew or should have known that their conduct was unlawful. A
recent Supreme Court case, Mullenix v. Luna, illustrates how reversing Harlow
might address this concern.2 13
ters for Congress to adjust through indemnification and other modes of calibrating official
zeal.").
210. For discussions of the difficulty of establishing constitutional violations against law en-
forcement see, for example, Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (2017).
211. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)).
212. See supra notes 6 and 56 and accompanying text.
213. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
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The facts relevant to Mullenix began when Tulia Police Department officers
attempted to arrest Israel Leija, Jr. for violating misdemeanor probation.2 14 Lei-
ja fled the scene in his car, and officers from several agencies participated in the
pursuit. Officers set up spike strips on the highway to puncture Leija's tires as
he drove by- a strategy they had been trained to use in just this type of situa-
tion. Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Chadrin Mullenix decided
that instead of setting up spike strips he would try to disable Leija's car by
shooting at it.2 1 5 He had received no training in shooting at a car to disable it
and was instructed by his supervisor not to do so.2 16 Nevertheless, Mullenix
fired six rounds at Leija's car as it passed under the bridge where Mullenix was
standing. Leija died, with one of the shots determined to be the cause of
death.2 17 Soon after the shooting, Mullenix remarked to his supervisor, "How's
that for proactive?" - an apparent reference to a conversation they had had ear-
ly in the day in which the superior had criticized the officer for not taking
enough initiative.2 18
The district court denied Mullenix's motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds, Mullenix filed an interlocutory appeal, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court granted Mullenix's
petition for certiorari and reversed. The Court did not answer whether Mul-
lenix violated the Constitution but instead held that prior cases had not clearly
established that his conduct was unconstitutional.2 19 Mullenix's remark to his
supervisor played no role in the analysis, as "an officer's actual intentions are
irrelevant" to the qualified immunity analysis.220 Restoring the subjective
prong to the qualified immunity analysis would likely change the outcome of a
case like Mullenix. Mullenix's "How's that for proactive?" statement would once
again be relevant to the qualified immunity analysis, and would constitute at
least triable evidence of bad faith.22 1
The Court could also reconsider other adjustments to qualified immunity
made with the express goal of shielding defendants from burdens of discovery
and trial. For example, the Court granted defendants the right to immediately
appeal denials of qualified immunity as a means of shielding defendants from
214. Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3 d 7 12, 715 (5th Cir. 2014), rev'd per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015).
215. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 3o6.
216. Id. at 3o6-07.
217. Id. at 307.
218. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 312 (majority opinion).
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burdens of discovery and trial.222 Yet my data show interlocutory appeals of
qualified immunity denials infrequently serve that function. Defendants filed
interlocutory appeals of 21.7% of decisions denying qualified immunity in
whole or part. Of the appeals that were filed, just 12.2% of the lower court deci-
sions were reversed in whole, and just 9.8% of the interlocutory appeals filed
resulted in case dismissals. Interlocutory appeals may have prompted case reso-
lutions in another way-39.o% of interlocutory appeals were never decided,
apparently because the cases were settled while the motions were pending.223
But defendants' interlocutory appeals rarely resulted in case dismissals on qual-
ified immunity grounds. It is far from clear that interlocutory appeals shield
defendants from litigation burdens - the time and money spent briefing and
arguing interlocutory appeals may in fact exceed the time and money saved in
the relatively few reversals on interlocutory appeal. If so, the policy objectives
motivating Mitchell militate in favor of eliminating the right of interlocutory
appeal.
Finally, and still more modestly, the Court could reconsider the restrictive
manner in which it defines "clearly established law." John Jeffries has written
that the Court's narrow definition of clearly established law is inspired by its
interest in facilitating qualified immunity dismissals at summary judgment.2 24
My data show that the Court's decisions are not having their intended effect.
Yet, as others have pointed out, the Court's doctrinal framework creates confu-
sion in the lower courts and protects bad actors when there is no prior case on
point.2 Jeffries's proposed solution is to focus the qualified immunity inquiry
not on whether the law was clearly established but, instead, on whether the de-
fendant's conduct was "clearly unconstitutional."22 6 I believe that my data sup-
port a more complete transformation of the doctrine, but this adjustment
would at least be a step in the right direction.
At this point, it is impossible to predict what impact these proposed chang-
es to qualified immunity doctrine would have on the litigation of constitutional
claims against law enforcement. Perhaps narrowing the qualified immunity de-
222. See supra Section I.B.3.
223. See supra Section 1II.D; cf Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Feder-
al Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1179 (1990) (assessing the impact of interlocutory
appeals for qualified immunity denials, and reporting that "the district judges with whom I
have spoken . .. all believed that defendants used the Mitchell appeal as a delaying tactic that
hampered litigation that would otherwise be tried or settled relatively quicldy").
224. See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 866. For the Court's most recent decisions interpreting what
constitutes clearly established law, see supra note 183.
225. See supra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
226. See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 867.
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fense, restoring the subjective prong, or eliminating qualified immunity alto-
gether would dramatically increase the number of suits filed against the police,
or increase the number of filed cases that were settled or tried. On the other
hand, these changes might inspire courts to place other limits on Section 1983
claims to maintain the status quo.22 7 This Article does not predict how changes
to qualified immunity doctrine might influence the collection of doctrines rele-
vant to constitutional litigation, or suggest the ideal ways in which they should
relate. My suggestions are motivated by a less lofty ambition -to achieve great-
er consistency across qualified immunity doctrine's structure, intended policy
goals, and actual role in constitutional litigation.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has dedicated an outsized portion of its
docket to qualified immunity motions in cases against law enforcement be-
cause, it has explained, the doctrine is so "important to 'society as a whole."'2 28
But the Court relies on no evidence to back up this fervently held position. In-
stead, my research shows that qualified immunity doctrine infrequently plays
its intended role in the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforce-
ment. Qualified immunity doctrine is unnecessary to shield law enforcement
officers from financial liability, and the doctrine infrequently protects govern-
ment officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial in filed cases.
Further exploration of dynamics unobservable through my dataset could reveal
other ways in which qualified immunity influences the litigation of civil rights
actions against law enforcement. At this point, however, available evidence in-
dicates that qualified immunity often is not functioning as assumed, and is not
achieving its intended goals. In an ideal world, all open empirical questions
about Section 1983 litigation would be answered before any applicable doctrine
was adjusted. But it is my view that the perfect should not be the enemy of the
good.22 9 The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, should adjust their quali-
fied immunity decisions to comport with this evidence.
227. See Fallon, supra note 59, at 486-89 (observing that adjustments to qualified immunity may
influence other aspects of constitutional doctrine).
228. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n-3 (2015)).
229. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 961.
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